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Nearly sixty years ago, Justice J. Allan Crockett predicted the future.  Beginning 
with “ideas” in a 1959 dissent, Justice Crockett and this Court reckoned with first principles 
of water law that are on a growth-driven collision course.  These principles are (1) priority, 
a foundation of western water law, and (2) “the highest possible development” of the state’s 
water sources, many of which are underground.  Such development, Justice Crockett wrote, 
is the “desideratum of our water law.”  That reckoning resulted ten years later in Wayman 
v. Murray City’s “rule of reasonableness,” which, at least regarding groundwater, directs 
the district courts to reconcile these first principles, using the “geology, physics, and 
hydrology” available to them, to spread the finite resource.   
Telling, in this groundwater interference case, are the district court’s questions 
during closing argument. They did not focus on Pineview’s admitted interference with 
Appellees’ senior groundwater diversions;1 they instead probed mostly what to do about 
it.2  Recognizing that there are no shortcuts to this Gordian knot, and invoking Wayman, 
the district court was wisely cautious.  It ordered, modestly, that the shared aquifer be tested 
to determine, first, whether the wells at issue can satisfy the parties’ rights without 
interfering with Appellees’ seniority.  Retaining jurisdiction to evaluate the results of this 
experiment, it retained the flexibility Wayman’s “rule of reasonableness” surely intends. 
This, according to Pineview, upends groundwater law. 
                                                          
1 (R.1244-50,1287-88,1296-1300).  
2 (R.1244-47,1288,1296-97).  
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Appellees anticipate that the Court will find no error in the pages of this record.  
Rather, it will find a fully engaged district court grappling with clear well interference, 
parties with limited resources, and a “rule of reasonableness” to guide its adjudication of 
the “trouble” Pineview caused. The Court will also find, we believe, that it is largely due 
to Appellees’ efforts that we know as much about the “geology, physics, and hydrology” 
of these aquifers as we do.  On that point, Pineview’s trial and appellate focus is also telling.  
In this groundwater-local well interference case, Pineview seems more interested in what’s 
happening on the surface rather than beneath it, where the parties’ competing wells divert 
limited water from these shared, fully appropriated aquifers. 
Interference disputes like this are precisely what Justice Crockett and this Court 
anticipated decades ago.  Justice Crockett’s “ideas” turned into predictions that became 
facts.  Utah’s growth guarantees that more cases like this are coming as rights move closer 
to rights, which is exactly what happened here.  Remedies will be the hardest issue.  The 
district court’s interference finding is fully supported by the facts—none of which 
Pineview seriously challenges and many of which its expert admits.  Far from the hellish 
result Pineview argues, the district court’s remedy has much to recommend it.  It is modest 
and starts with testing, which is practical and doable given party resources, and puts the 
onus precisely where it belongs—on Pineview, the undisputed cause of the interference. 
Finally, Pineview repeatedly derides as merely of academic interest the “geology, 
physics, and hydrology” Appellees provided the district court.  (Brf.26,28,29).  That’s not 
how the district court saw it.  But more importantly, in a groundwater case, such thorough 
 
3 
study is inseparable from Wayman’s directive to apply reason when attempting to reconcile 
first principles. 
ISSUES, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARDS 
(Code cites are the Utah Code) 
 
 Generally, bench tried legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, and factual 
findings for clear error. Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, ¶¶27-
28; UtahR.Civ.P.52(a)(protects findings “unless clearly erroneous,” after “due regard” for 
“opportunity to judge” witness “credibility”).  Findings are “clearly erroneous only if … 
against the clear weight of the evidence.”  Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 
UT 94, ¶12 (modified).  
1. Where, like other property rights, Appellees’ senior water rights are bundled 
“sticks,” each a separate element of the right, whether Pineview’s underground 
diversion, which drains the local aquifers that are the source of those senior rights, 
diverted also by wells, interferes with one or more of those elements. 
Preserved at R.1220-1223, and reviewed as a “mixed question.”  “The trial court 
must first find facts regarding the claim of interference and then determine whether those 
facts are within the ambit of interference as applied to the water right at issue.”  Wayment 
v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ¶9 (citations omitted). On such “mixed question[s],” the district 
court’s application of law to fact “typically [gets] some level of deference ….”  Id.  
When “the issue of interference is extremely fact depend[e]nt,” as it was here and 
likely always will be in groundwater cases, the district court gets “broad deference ….”  Id.  
The issue in this case is extremely fact-dependent and expert-driven “because underground 
 
4 
waters cannot be observed nor measured with precision, but must be determined on the 
basis of geology, physics and hydrology …,” Wayman, at 863, relative to “the water right 
at issue, Wayment, ¶9.  “[A]ppealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty 
to marshal the evidence.” Id.; see State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶42.   
Deference under mixed question review, however, depends on the nature of the 
issue.  State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶25 (“selecting the appropriate standard . . . from the 
spectrum of possible levels of deference”).3  Concerning water, this Court invokes “a 
strong public policy interest in promoting consistent and predictable results in disputes over 
the permissible use of that water” such that “district court discretion [is] somewhat 
constrained ….” Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, ¶18 (emphasis added). This 
action, however, does not concern, at least directly, the “permissible use” of water. Searle 
addressed a proposed change in use—point of diversion—under §73-3-3 and -8. Searle, 
¶¶4,23.  Here, changed use is not the issue.  Rather, in this straightforward interference 
action, junior groundwater rights are diverted too close to senior groundwater rights, 
interfering in multiple ways.  (R.406,1248,1214).  Invoking Levin’s revised Pena factors, 
nothing about this case warrants restricted deference. See Levin, ¶25.  Rather, Wayman 
creates a large “pasture,” State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-938 (Utah 1994), granting the 
                                                          
3 Considering: “(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule 
is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on 
‘facts’ observed by the trial judge … relevant to the application of the law that cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record …’ and (3) other ‘policy reasons … for or against 
granting discretion ….’” Levin, ¶25 (citations omitted). 
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district court quite broad discretion, guided by what surely will be a case-specific, fact-
driven “rule of reasonableness.”  Wayman, at 865.   
2. Where Appellee’s senior rights consist of several elements, whether full or even 
unauthorized use of one of those elements—quantity or purpose of use—immunizes 
Pineview as a matter of law against a claim of interference with other elements of 
the rights. 
Preserved at R.221,1220. This issue of first impression presents a legal question that 
turns on the “interpretation of prior precedent, statutes, and the common law,” reviewed 
for “correctness.”  Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ¶6. 
3. Where Pineview knew or should have known that its twice pump-tested #4 well 
interfered with Appellees’ nearby wells diverting from the same source, whether the 
district court erred in finding it negligent for operating that well, interfering with the 
function of the existing wells and their only source, thereby interfering with the 
senior water rights they divert.  
Preserved at R.1248-1250 and reviewed as a “mixed” finding that “calls for 
deference to the lower court.” Manzanares v. Byington, 2012 UT 35, ¶43.  
4. On the question of injunctive relief, where the district court enjoys some of its 
broadest discretion to fashion a remedy under Wayman’s “rule of reasonableness,” 
the purpose of which is to “insur[e] the highest possible development and … the 
most continuous beneficial use of all available water …,” id. 862, whether (a) the 
district court erred when it ordered the parties to determine aquifer yield relative to 
the rights of each, retaining jurisdiction to evaluate the results, thus preserving its 
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authority to fashion different or additional remedies, and (b) whether Pineview 
preserved this issue, having failed to propose meaningful alternatives under 
Wayman. 
Preserved at R.223-224,293,321-322 and reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
Wayman, at 865.  “[T]o the extent that the pasture is large, the trial judge has considerable 
freedom in applying a legal principle to the facts ….”  Pena, at 937.  
5. On the question of damages, where Appellees own the senior rights in a source 
invaded by Pineview’s junior diversion, and as a matter of law are entitled to the 
first water from that source, whether they are obligated to pay Pineview for that 
water after their access to it was cut off by Pineview’s multifaceted interference. 
Preserved at R.221-222, and reviewed for correctness regarding the “rule [or 
method] for measuring damages,” Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 UT 81, 
¶28 (citation omitted), and for clear error regarding the amount. Id. ¶21 (“damage 
determination was a question of fact”). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Trial exhibits are identified as “P-Ex. _,” and D-Ex. _”) 
 
1. The Local Aquifers 
 
“The effort to try to understand the case and to try to solve it” with some 
semblance of the “scientific method has all been on [Appellees].  They 
are the ones who paid for the monitoring.” They incurred “the expense to 
put these monitoring devices in their well and attempt to resolve the case 
with clear data.”   
 
(Paul Anderson, geologist)(R.783).4  
                                                          




“An aquifer is a geologic formation, or group of formations that yield usable 
quantities of water to wells and springs.” (R.1120). Here, there are two: A bedrock 
formation known as the “Norwood Tuff,” overlaid with unconsolidated material, 
(R.393,647,650), and characterized by the USGS as “low permeability.” (R.648). “[T]he 
unconsolidated material is generally … a much better aquifer material…” because bedrock 
“is very tight … it has very low permeability, or porosity.” (R.650-51). Fracturing, 
however, can “enhance its hydrologic characteristics ….” (R.393,651). “An aquitard is a 
lower permeability layer, a less permeable geologic layer.” (R.1121). The aquifers 
experience normal seasonal fluctuations—drawdown in the summer and recharge in the 
fall, winter, and spring.  (R.393,779-81,1129).  Overall, there is no general decline. 
(R.393,811). This area is within the Weber River “[d]rainage,” (P-Ex.10A), which along 
with the Ogden River, is “fully appropriated.”5 
2. Water and Wells Generally    
Water flows from high to low pressure. (R.394,960). “[I]t can flow uphill, or 
downhill, but it's related to that pressure [g]radient. If the deeper aquifer has a higher head 
than the shallower aquifer, but it's above it, we’d call that a pressure head differential. And 
that there's a differential for flow to go from one to the other.” (R.960). “[S]tatic head” in 
                                                          
5 Pursuant to Evidence Rule 201(c), the Court may, on request, judicially notice the records 
and policy of the Utah Division of Water Rights concerning the Weber River drainage.  
The Court may find the Division’s current policy here: 
http://www.waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/policy/wrareas/area35.asp 
(Addendum 4); see also Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶30, n.8 (“[J]udicial 
notice may be taken of [water right] documents as public records.”)(modified). 
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a well is the water level “when the well [is] not pumping,” “[v]ersus a pumping head” when 
it is. (R.658). Well casings are perforated to allow water in. (R.674-75).   
A pumped well creates a “cone of depression,” in which the water level drops 
“rapidly within the well. And then gradually away from the well, in this arc shape … if you 
think of it in three dimensions … it's a cone.” (R.670,1122; cf. Bingham v. Roosevelt City 
Corp., 2010 UT 37, ¶3.). The cone’s actual three-dimensional shape depends on 
surrounding geology. (R.395,670-71).  The cone creates a “radius of influence,” a zone 
measured from the well outward “that is dewatered due to well pumping.” (R.394).  
 
(R.669-671;P-Ex.52). 
Seasonal precipitation (“re-charge”), and withdrawals from wells (“discharge”), is 
typical. (R.699,857).  The United States Geological Service uses monitoring wells “all 
around the State … in different … hydrologic basins” for “long-term [water level] 
monitoring.” (R.766). One such well near Huntsville “is monitoring ground water level in 
the Ogden valley near” these parties’ wells. Id. Monitoring shows expected seasonal 




3. Snowberry Inn Rights and Well 
 
Araves built, owned, operated, and lived in the Snowberry Inn bed and breakfast for 
a dozen years before moving to their current home nearby.  (R.5). The Inn was originally 
served with a “6-inch well, 120 feet deep,” (the “Red House well” (R.499)) for .015 cfs, 
year-round (.45 acre-feet), (P-Ex.10A;R.520,626), for “[d]omestic: [o]ne family,” with a 
“1960” priority. (P-Ex.10A). The “source of supply” is “Underground water.” Id.6  They 
installed a “cistern,” a “storage tank with a monitoring system … to ensure the pump 
wouldn't run dry and destroy [it].”  (R.500). The cistern was measured at an “effective 
capacity” of approximately 300 gallons. (R.847). The Red House well was replaced in 2001 
with the current SI well, (P-Ex.20;R.395), because of “poor yield” (sand may have 
infiltrated). (R.696-98;P-Exs.18-20;695). The new well is 75’ away.  (R.697). The pump 
fills the cistern and then turns off.  Another pumping system gets the water, under pressure, 
to the Inn.  (R.522-23). The Red House well was limited to the unconsolidated aquifer. 
(R.395,693). 
                                                          
6 Pineview contends that the diversion rate of the SI right is a “condition” “added to avoid 
local shallow wells from pumping too aggressively and depleting the local aquifer.” (Brf.7-
8, citing D-Ex.55). The source for that claim, the State Engineer’s 1961 Memorandum 
Decision approving the SI water right, states that these “small domestic and stockwatering 
uses” “should [] be allowed” because they “will not deplete the flow of the Weber or Ogden 
River systems.” (D-Ex.55,¶2). It also states, “[e]ach of the applications has been reduced 
in quantity to .015 sec.-ft. (6.73 gallons per minute) for the domestic requirements of one 
family, or a forest camp, and stockwatering purposes.” Id. There is no mention of the 
“condition” Pineview urges.  Rather, like all appropriations and approved changes, SI’s 
right was certificated “subject to prior rights.” (P-Ex.10A). See §73-3-17(1),(6). So was 
Pineview’s when it moved rights to #4. (P-Ex.33).  
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The old and new SI wells showed similar static water levels, within one foot, 
(R.395,703-04;cf.P-Exs.19-20), suggesting they hit the same aquifer. (R.395,704,1149-
50(Loughlin: “good indication” of same aquifer)).  The 2001 SI well is likely perforated in 
“both unconsolidated material … and [Norwood] … right across the boundary,” 
(R.700,702), but the ratio in each is unknown. (R.986-87).7  SI pumps between 20 and 30 
gallons-per-minute (“gpm”). (R.815-16). Araves sold the Inn to Venture in 2005. (R.5). 
Pat Dohrer assisted in the purchase of the Inn and managed it from approximately August 
2005 to August 2014.  (R.540).  The current SI Well is 133 feet deep, with perforations at 
105 to 125 feet.  (R.6,395,702). 
4. Arave and Southwick Rights and Well  
The Arave well “was drilled to a total depth of 187 feet, with both 6 and 4-inch 
diameter casing. The 4-inch casing runs from 80[’] to 187[’]. The 6-inch from 0 to 80[’].” 
(R.686). It is perforated at 140-170.’ (R.395,686,689). When drilled, “the static level was 
28 feet below the land surface.”  (R.687). The lower portion of the well, from 130’ to 180’, 
is likely in Norwood, which is the source of its water. (R.688-89). Its perforations “are 
completely within the Norwood …” and “do not communicate directly with the 
unconsolidated material.” (R.714). The Arave well was cleaned in 2013. (R.690;P-Ex.16).  
The Araves own Water Right 35-1483, for year-round use, “[d]omestic: one family,” and 
                                                          
7 “[W]e don't know how much …” (R.702). “[T]hat's an interpretation that you're forced to 
make by some of the ambiguities of drillers’ logs.” (R.703). P-Ex.28 is Anderson’s cross-
section of all the wells showing relative positions, including perforation zones. (R.706-15). 
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“[s]tockwatering: 2 horses.”  (P-Ex.11A). Its source is “[u]nderground water (well),” id., 
with a 1963 priority and a 0.15 cfs (.506 acre-feet).  (P-Ex.11A;R.212,391,518-19,692).8 
Janet Southwick’s water right (35-6773) is for 1 acre-foot from the Arave well 
allowing .25 acres of irrigation and one EDU with a 1978 priority. (R.391,574-75;P-
Ex.12A-12D).  Her home is just north of the Inn. (R.573).    
5. Pineview Well #4 
 
a. Paul Anderson’s prior contact 
 
Anderson was contacted in 2001 by Radford, a developer planning to drill a well. 
(R.639). Using a groundwater model, they identified a location where Radford could find 
water. (R.639-40). “[S]hortly after that,” Radford ordered Anderson to “stop all the work” 
because he wanted “to re-think this thing.” (R.640). He contacted Anderson again in 2003 
explaining that he wanted to “drill an irrigation well.” Id. They discussed “optimal places,” 
Anderson researched the local geology “and tried to advise [Radford]” on the likelihood 
“of producing the amount of water he” was looking for. Id.  
Anderson determined that a well could encounter water based on local geology. 
(R.641). While he “talked in general terms,” he “was never consulted about the specifics 
of the location.” (R.642). A year later, Radford returned, explaining that he had begun 
drilling, was about 200’ down, and had drilling samples he wanted Anderson to see. 
(R.642). Anderson saw, and determined that drilling had encountered Norwood. (R.642). 
Radford retrieved the materials; Anderson “never heard from [him] again.” (R.643). 
                                                          
8 “ELU” or “equivalent livestock unit” (R.195). And one EDU—“equivalent domestic 
unit.”  (R.195,520,574). 
 
12 
b. Pineview tests and later operates #4 
Well #4 was drilled in 2004. (R.502-03). Its priority is October 14, 2005. 
(R.392;Brf.10-11).9  It was pump-tested and shut down the Arave well inside of a day, 
(R.396,503-04), after which it recovered within a day.  (R.396,504).  A second pump-test 
shut down Arave again.  (R.396,504-05).10 The #4 is 738 feet deep, (R.395), perforated in 
four zones, starting in the “unconsolidated deposits,” “typically where water will flow 
better, faster.” (R.681). The lower three perforation zones are in Norwood. Id. #4 pulls 
water from both aquifers. (R.681-82,713).11  The #4 and SI wells pull water from both the 
unconsolidated and Norwood. (R.713).  
Well #4 is in hydrologic communication with both the SI and Arave Wells. (R.714-
15,1142-45,1130-31). The SI well appears to have “a considerable influence from the 
[much more permeable] unconsolidated aquifer.” (R.705-06).  The SI Well reaction to #4 
pumping is delayed, or “baffled,” (R.785-89,961-63,1234-35), likely explained by “which 
way the fractures flow or are oriented within the Norwood,” (R.962-63), or the hydrologic 
connection between the Norwood and the unconsolidated material (recall that SI Well 
perforations may intersect both the Norwood and the unconsolidated).  (R.700,702). 
#4’s “cone of depression” grows up to 1200 feet quickly, encompassing both the 
Arave and SI wells, pulling water “away from those perforations.” (R.794-95,1130-31). 
                                                          
9 Pineview also owns water right No.35-7263, modified by a change application, with a 
2003 priority. (D-Ex.4).  
10 #4’s well log, P-Ex.14, is explained at R.675-79. 
11 Anderson explained factors that complicate a precise determination of which zones 
produce water. (R.682-83), “but the preponderance of depth of this well is in the Norwood 
Tuff,” suggesting that it is the largest source. (R.683). 
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The speed of #4’s cone indicates some fracturing in the Norwood, explaining why that 
normally less transmissive material allows water to move more quickly. (R.795-96). #4 
pumps at 100-105 gpm, (Brf.11), much more volume from the aquifer than SI or Arave.  
(R.794,883,885-86). 
c. “Trouble” 
For Pineview’s expert, a non-technical definition of “safe yield” is “the amount of 
ground water that can be pumped from a well or wells without getting into trouble.” 
(R.1121-22).12  Such “trouble” means, for example, pumping the water to such a level as 
to interfere with someone else’s water right.  (R.1122). Pineview began operating #4 in 
2007, effectively shutting down the Arave well again. (R.396,577).  Araves agreed “to pay 
$20 for [Pineview] to provide [them] water through its system.”  (R.505). Pineview 
immediately connected Araves, “and disconnected [their] water system to the home from 
the well,” making them Pineview customers.  (R.397,505,1256-57).     
“Trouble” in the SI well started in August 2007 after #4 came online, and the Inn 
“ran out” of water. (R.541). They first noticed the problem when the Inn “had no water,” 
(R.541-42), with nothing coming out of the faucet. (R.542). Prior to #4, the Inn’s new well 
“never had any interruptions” or “problems at all.” (R.398,541,605).  After #4, SI didn’t 
have “any water.” Id.  Unable to pump, Dohrer hooked a hose to Araves home (connected 
to Pineview by then, R.542) “to fill the cistern.” (R.605-06,1238). Until connecting to 
                                                          
12 Not to be confused with the statutory definition of “safe yield,” having to do with 
groundwater management plans.  §73-5-15. 
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Pineview’s system, it was “a constant battle of checking the cistern to make sure we had 
water.” (R.541).  
With #4 pumping, the cistern would not fill, “[a]nd we’d have to supplement 
through the hose up to [Arave’s] house.” Id. This lifeline from Araves was used until 
Pineview connected the Inn. (R.542-43). When #4 pumps, SI struggles.  When #4 is off, 
SI works just fine. (R.943-46). The difference is stark: SI pumping alone drops the head 
“about 6 feet versus” “almost 40 feet during summer” when #4 pumps. (R.945-46). Even 
when “you see this rise in head regionally, you can still see that [SI] is still being affected 
by the pumping of” #4.  (R.963).  SI “pumping is the worst in terms of how far down it’s 
drawn … when [#4] had its greatest effect on the Arave head.” (R.964).13 
d. More “trouble” 
Following a change in Pineview management, Araves tried but were unable to agree 
on written terms. (R.505). After several years operating under their handshake deal, things 
soured, resulting in this action.  (R.505-06). Araves did not pay for water when they had, 
and could use, their well.  (R.506). Pineview even back-charged Araves at higher rates and 
threatened to shut off water if not paid. (R.506-08). The Pineview water caused “staining” 
in the Arave home. (R.509-10). Other than “normal wear and tear,” Araves had no water 
availability or pressure issues prior to #4. (R.510-11). Neither did they have such issues 
with the SI well. (R.511). Araves had their well cleaned and the pump removed and 
                                                          
13 Based on the underlying assumption, agreed to by Pineview’s expert, that the monitored 




replaced with monitoring equipment. (R.512). Araves did not want to be Pineview 
customers. (R.516).  
They used their well indoors and for garden watering, (R.517), having been told by 
the Division of Water Rights that they could water their yard. (R.537-38). Araves have not 
reconnected their well since Pineview connected them. (R.524-25). It continues to be used 
for monitoring, providing cleaner data. (R.397,1132,781-82). The prior Pineview president 
(Brockbank) oversaw their connection to the system. (R.1065; P-Ex.56). 
The Inn experienced a number of issues caused by Pineview’s water—clogged 
faucets, for example. (R.401,543-45). The Inn’s dealings with Pineview were the same as 
Araves—cooperative at first, deteriorating later. (R.550-51). Like Araves, the Inn also paid 
a flat $20 per month. (R.397,550-51). The Inn’s Pineview connection was, and is, 
supplemented by its well. (R.556-57). Pineview water was used indoors. (R.558). Dohrer 
kept a log of well vs. Pineview water use, (R.398,563-64;P-Ex7), and at trial explained that 
his log was not perfect.  (R.399,995-96). The Inn did not pay for water when it could use 
its well. (R.565). 
Southwick lost water quickly after #4 was tested, causing her sprinklers to fill with 
silt, later having to replace some of them due to buildup, (R.401,576,582).  The second 
pump test damaged her washing machine, requiring a new one. (R576,581-82). The loss of 
water from the Arave well “affected everything in [her] house that ran water ….” (R.577). 
Pineview’s water pressure to Southwick’s home was deficient. (R.583-84). Repairs were 
attempted, but still she “can’t do two things [using water] in [her] house” at the same time.  
Id.  Prior to #4, Southwick never had water problems other than an instance of frozen pipes. 
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Id. Because irrigating with Pineview water is costly, Southwick lost her lawn, trees, and 
other foliage around her home. (R.580).14 Additional problems were ongoing at the time of 
trial. (R.584). She had no such problems before connecting to Pineview. (R.582-83).15 
Since 2014, Andrea Burk (Southwick’s daughter, R.593) operates the Inn pursuant 
to a lease with Venture.  (R.399,590).  She dealt with the hard water and pressure problems 
when she lived with Southwick. (R.593-94). She also experienced hard water issues, 
sometimes such that “the system has shut down completely while” guests are there.  (R.592 
She did not understand the particulars of the Venture water right, and she did not measure 
water flow from the SI well. (R.594-95). A pump in the Inn pulls water from the cistern 
and fills pressurized tanks that distribute water throughout the Inn.  (R.996-98). Inn 
sprinklers were on timers to water every few days.  (R.999-1001). Burk did not realize until 
trial that she was using well water for the lawn.  She thought she had turned it off.  Id. She 
simply didn’t understand the valve operation between the Pineview and well water. 
(R.399,1010-13,1016,1020).  The original Venture right is not approved for outdoor use.  
(R.1011).  
Dohrers assigned claims to Venture, consisting of expenses incurred.  (R.604;P-
Ex.1).  Venture paid nearly $8,000 to connect to Pineview. (R.606). Venture asked the 
Dohrers and Burk to use both the SI well and Pineview water to ensure that the Venture 
                                                          
14 Pineview’s connection to Southwick’s home leaked, causing her to pay for excess water 
she did not and could not use. (R.581). The leak was repaired. Id.   




water right was not at risk of forfeiture. (R.606,622-23).16 The Venture right was not 
enough to meet SI’s “needs,” which admittedly exceeded its “rights.” Venture squared up 
matters with the state engineer when it augmented its supply with a state engineer approved 
2 acre-foot right, (R.398,607-08;P-Ex.10F), with 2017 priority, (R.630-31), allowing 
outside irrigation use (.75 acre-feet) and commercial use for 1.25 acre-feet, all based on 
usage calculations and estimates. (R.627-28).  
 Venture incurred costs as a result of losing its “water independence” and its 
connection to Pineview. (R.609). In November 2013, Pineview threatened to cut off water 
service to the Inn, forcing this action. (R.614). Venture prepared a calculation of the Inn’s 
water use since Burk began managing it. (R.617). Neither Arave nor SI wells were metered.  
(R.536,619-20).  During the three year period prior to trial (before augmenting its right), 
the Inn averaged .58 acre-feet.  (R617-18). Then Venture determined its water use during 
the period prior to #4 turning on, typically July 1 each year.  (R.618). Venture used .29 
acre-feet of its right prior to July 1.17   
6. Anderson’s Well Monitoring 
Araves retained Anderson, a geologist, for well monitoring, (R.635-38), and 
Venture agreed to split that cost “to understand more about what’s going on ….”  (R.635).18 
                                                          
16 §73-1-4. 
17 The Inn’s water use declined after Burk began sending out some of the laundry. 
(R.592,620). SI used approximately .33 af of its water right before #4 turns on. (R.1022-
23,1025)(average use using Pineview figures). Prior use likely exceeded that calculation 
for the recent past.  (R.1027-28). 
18 Pineview criticizes Anderson for conflating water “needs” with “rights.” (Brf.47). 
Perhaps he did, (R.867-68), but he was not retained to evaluate the “rights;” he was retained 
to do some “science” and “to gather some … hard data to try to understand exactly what 
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They developed a plan and installed monitors in the Arave and SI wells, a device that “will 
sense the pressure in the water column” in the well, “recording pressure readings as the 
water levels fluctuate.” (R.654).19 Their purpose was (still is) “to try to gather some science, 
or some real information because [Appellees] were having great difficulty with Pineview 
….” (R.654-55). Anderson did not evaluate potential interference from other wells in the 
area.  (R.936-37).  The SI and Arave wells do not interfere with each other: “the impact of 
pumping such a low rate in the [SI], and the fact that it's a combined aquifer of the 
unconsolidated and the Tuff, that it's not a great enough volume of water to get that cone 
of depression” to the Arave well. (R.989). 
Anderson’s 2013 SI pump tests demonstrated that, without #4 depleting the aquifer, 
“[i]t's sort of the happy time for the Snowberry aquifer.”  (R.797). Without #4 pumping, 
“it only took about 10-15 minutes for [the SI well] to fill the cistern.” (R.797-98;P-Ex.23 
(Addendum 6). When #4 pumps, however, “there's quite a profound difference in terms of 
the length of time that it takes to fill the cistern.” (R.805). Without #4, the SI head drops 
only six feet while filling the cistern. (R.804,945-46). With #4 on, it drops nearly 40 feet, 
and possibly more. (R.945-46).20 Unfortunately, “there are no head values from [#4].”  
(R.782).  
                                                          
was happening in those wells.” (R.654-55). The district court credited his analysis over 
Loughlin’s assumptions.  (R.401).   
19 More water in the “tube” means more pressure, less water means less pressure. (R.654). 
20 Possibly more because it drops from 62 feet down to 99, where the sensor is, and we 
“don't have measurement beyond that.”  (R.805-06). 
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When #4 is off, “the length of time that the [SI] pump is on to supply the irrigation 
system is relatively short. And when the level gets below 58 feet, the pump seems to 
struggle to meet that same demand, as evidenced by the pumping head.” (R.932). The 
problem is not about a particular “volume.”  Id. Rather, the SI well must pump longer 
“cycles” to keep up because “the pump has to remain on a lot longer to supply an assumed 
similar volume of water.” (R.933).21  Anderson’s conclusions are based on 2013 data.  He 
did not have #4 pumping dates for 2014-2017, but because the monitored Arave well is 
such a good “proxy” for #4, Anderson could determine #4 pumping by looking at Arave 
well data. (R.937-38,954). Pumping #4 is the only way to generate the data.  (R.950). When 
#4 was restarted after an off period, the Arave well responded “immediately,” (R.953), 
dropping “continually” as long as #4 pumps. (R.953-54). 
Some of SI’s drawdown is based on its own cone of depression. (R.982). True of all 
wells. Bingham, ¶3.  The problem is a cascading effect triggered when #4 dewaters the 
aquifer, causing Arave level to plummet, creating downward pressure on SI, causing it to 
struggle severely. (R.789-90;P-Ex23). A “pressure differential” is created when the Arave 
level drops below the SI head.  (R.790). As a result, “we see this relationship that when the 
head differential changes, that [SI] seems to struggle in order to produce the water that's 
being called for by the [I]nn, and this takes place in all of the monitoring years.” (R.791; 
see also R.792,807-08).   
                                                          
21 Anderson “assum[es] that when they sprinkle in the spring … and when they irrigate in 
the summer, whatever they put on [in terms of volume] “stays the same ….”  (R.933). 
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The apparent connection between the Norwood and the unconsolidated explains the 
different but correlated reactions in the Arave and SI wells. (R.792-93). Thus, “[r]egardless 
of some of the wrangling of hydrogeologists, there's this high correlation between no 
trouble prior to [#4], and problems after [#4].” (R.793-94, and see R.961). Anderson could 
not say precisely how those aquifers communicate. (R.809,892-93).22  We need more data.  
More on that below.  Pineview’s hypothesis that SI pumping creates its own problems 
could be tested “if we could get [#4] to stop pumping for a summer season. And then we 
could monitor the Snowberry well ….” (R.982). 
7. Pineview Operation 
Turner was elected Pineview president in 2009 “when the developer, at that time, 
was president and was bowing out ….” (R.1043;P-Ex.56). Appellees are not Pineview 
shareholders; they are “contract users.” (R.1047). #4 pumps early July to early September 
depending on weather. (R.397,1055-56).  It “run[s]… up to 12 hours a day, [“typically 
every day”] during the max of the summer dry period” depending on weather. (R.1056-
57). Pineview does not know how much it diverts from its surface sources—it has no weir.  
(R.1067-68). It has 70 connections with buildout to 114. (R.1073). Its system is plumbed 
to serve additional lots from #4. (R.1075-76). It remains to be determined whether 
                                                          
22 The higher Arave water level compared to SI creates “an upward gradient between these 
two perforated zones.” (R.968). That pressure “gradient” reverses when #4 pumps, pulling 
water away from Arave, causing SI to crash also. (R.968-69). This reversal creates the 
“potential for flow to go from the unconsolidated down to the Norwood.” (R.969-70,987).  




Pineview expands service. (R.1078-79). It already does not have enough supply for more 
secondary water. (R.1079).23 
8. Pineview’s Expert – Loughlin 
Loughlin sees no “relationship between pumping [SI] and the water level in the 
Arave well.” (R.1094,95).  #4 drops the level in Arave but not in SI. (R.1097-98). He 
contends that SI’s trouble is caused by seasonal declines and its own pumping. (R.1099-
1100). He agrees with Anderson that “the water level in the Arave well is a very good 
surrogate” for when #4 “is on and when it’s off.” (R.1104-05,1119-20).  He used 
Anderson’s data. (R.1106). He has no doubt that #4 was pumped as indicated on 
Anderson’s graphs. (R.1119, see P-Exs.23, 24, 26 (Addendum 7); 27 (Addendum 8); 29 
(Addendum 9), 30).24 Where there was missing data, Loughlin was sure that #4 was 
pumping “[b]ecause we know from the pumping in 2013 that the water level--pumping 
[#4] lowers the water level in the Arave well.” (R.1119). 
He agrees that  
a. A radius of influence terminates where the cone ends, as illustrated on P-
Ex.52. (R.1124). 
b. Water flows down gradient from high to low pressure, higher head to lower 
head, or in the direction of decreasing pressure.  (R.1125).  
                                                          
23 Turner did not know of any company records regarding existing water rights before #4 
was drilled. (R.1076). 
24 Loughlin did a couple of his own graphs, (D-Ex.48)(using Anderson’s data), and one 
that Appellees liked. (P-Ex.40)(R.1139-40)(“showing that connection between [#4] and 
Arave, correct?  [Answer:] Yes.”). 
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c. #4 interferes with Arave. (R.1125-26).25 
d. There is no doubt the Arave well is within #4’s cone of depression. (R.1129). 
e. SI is closer to #4 by a couple hundred feet and also within #4’s cone of 
depression and within its radius of influence. (R.1130-31).26 
f. Arave responds to #4 pumping “within minutes, or at least within an hour or 
so.” (R.1131). Arave level “drops steeply,” which continues as long as #4 
pumps. (R.1131;cf.R.772-75,777,811,813).27 
g. The “notches” on P-Ex.27 show #4 pump cycling on and off. (R.1132). 
That’s why Arave is a good surrogate for #4—its quick response to #4.  Id. 
See also P-Ex.40. (R.1139-41). 
h. Not pumping Arave provides cleaner data. (R.1132).28  
i. #4 has four perorated zones, one in both the unconsolidated and Norwood 
and three in the Norwood. (R.1133,1135-36). 
j. SI gets a portion and probably the majority of its water from the 
unconsolidated aquifer, (R.1133,1138), and #4 pulls from the unconsolidated 
                                                          
25 Yet, it does not matter to Loughlin whether #4 is pumping to determine whether the 
Arave well can produce the Arave and Southwick water rights. (R.1127). 
26 Loughlin drew #4’s cone on P-Ex.29, explaining, “[i]t probably looks something like 
that.” (R.1130). 
27 Or, as Pineview counsel explained during cross, when #4 “starts, we see an immediate, 
or near immediate decline [in Arave]. When it stops, we see a near immediate increase.” 
(R.979-80). 
28 Agreeing with Anderson, (R.781-82), “With no pumping [in the Arave well], we can 
clearly see these relationships.” (R.782). 
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aquifer. (R.1133;P-Ex.29). Yet, he insists on “zero communication” between 
#4 and SI. (R.1138-39). 
k. SI and Arave may communicate. (R.1142-45).   
l. #4 affects Arave due to the “response of a confined aquifer . . . . It is 
transmitting the lower pressure created by pumping [#4] away from the 
[well].” (R.1146).   
m. Arave water level is higher than SI. (R.1156-57,1160; P-Ex.27)(elevation 
above sea level). 
n. Depending on the well, lowering the pump too close to or at the perforations 
can cause the pump to take in silt. (R.1159-60). 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The action was filed December, 2013. (R.1-15). Trial to the bench was August 17-
18, 29, and September 25, 2017.  (R.263-69,355). The parties filed trial briefs (R.191-262) 
and competing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (“FFCL”). (R.270-323). 
The district court rejected Pineview’s FFCL October 19, 2017, (R.356-86), and adopted 
Appellees’ in its Memorandum Decision November 14, 2017. (R.387-414)(Addendum 1).  
The court found that pumping “well #4 interferes with the Arave well, thus 
interfering with the senior Arave [and Southwick] water rights.”  (R.408-409). Further, that 
pumping “interferes with the SI well, thus interfering with the senior Venture water rights.”  
(R.409). The court found that “[t]he fact that, historically, SI . . . has or may have used 
more water than is permitted by its water right is not a defense to local well interference” 
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and it is not “a defense that SI used water for irrigation when it did not then have” an 
approved right for that purpose.  (R.410). 
Because the “#4, Arave and SI wells cannot coexist” under these circumstances, the 
court ordered Pineview to “stop[]” or “curtail[]” its pumping of #4 “sufficiently to permit 
the Arave and SI wells to function.”  (R.411). “[I]n aid of its judgment,” the court 
“retain[ed] jurisdiction” to determine “whether … [#4] can be pumped at a lesser rate so 
as not to interfere” with both the Arave and SI wells.  (R.412,440,442).  If not, “the court 
may order that [Pineview] provide replacement water pursuant to §73-3-23 at [its] sole 
expense.” (R.412-13,441).   
The court also ruled that Pineview breached its duty of “reasonable care” when it 
operated #4 in a “manner that interferes with plaintiffs’ wells.” (R.409).  It awarded 
damages based on interference and negligence. (R.413). Final judgment was entered 
January 4, 2018 (R.439-42)(Addendum 2), adding Rule 54(d) costs on January 10, 2018. 
(R.445-46)(Addendum 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Bundling elements of a water right – quantity, place of use, purpose of use, source, 
diversion means and method, and priority – the law protects them all against interference.  
The district court understood both the analogy and the water rights at issue.  It got it right 
and determined that pumping of Pineview’s interfering well had to stop until it could figure 
out a way for all three wells to coexist, if possible. 
The facts, at least the ones above ground where Pineview prefers to focus, are 
simple.  The part of the case that matters most, however, is hundreds of feet below the 
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ground, where things get more complex.  Despite their senior, year-round rights, Appellees 
cannot divert their water for up to three months, while #4 pumps.  The data shows it, and 
Pineview knew it, which is why it connected them to its system that first summer of 
“trouble.”  Even without complete pumping measurements and records, the evidence of 
Pineview’s interference with several “sticks” in Appellees’ rights is clear and compelling.   
The interference issue was driven mostly by expert testimony.  Pineview’s expert 
admitted that both the Arave and SI wells are inside #4’s cone of depression. Analytically, 
that presented a problem, so he assumed that a geologic barrier, an aquitard, separated and 
sealed the SI well from the de-watering effects of that cone. The district court didn’t buy 
it.  Likewise, this Court should not be persuaded by Pineview’s misguided argument about 
source – that Bingham applies here.  The facts in that case are not only distinguishable in 
terms of remedy, they explain how #4’s operation obstructs and hinders access to the 
groundwater on which Appellees have the senior call.   
In this local well and groundwater interference case, the district court roamed its 
broad pasture and evaluated its options.  Its probing questions during closing argument 
reveal an engaged court, duty-bound to remedy a problem no one can actually see. It 
appropriately awarded interference damages and fashioned remedies well within 
Wayman’s “rule of reasonableness.” It also ignored the competitive rallying cry that 
Appellees should just “chase their water.”  Most importantly, the district court wisely left 
room to adjust remedies to fit future data.   Pineview is wrong in its claim that this result 
upends groundwater law; it is rather the precise effort district courts must undertake to both 
honor priority while stretching a finite resource. 
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 ARGUMENT  
A. The district court correctly found interference with senior rights. 
Interference is “obstructing or hindering the quantity or quality of an existing water 
right.”  Wayment, ¶13 (affirming interference).29  Interference comes in many forms 
because a water right consists of many things.  It is real property.  §57-1-1(3) (R.404).30  
As such, it is usefully described as a “bundle” of rights, Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 558 
P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977)(real property is “bundle of sticks”), each representing some 
feature of the usufruct. See, e.g., State v. Starley, 413 S.W.2d 451, 463 (Tex.Civ.App. 
1967)(“the complex bundle of legal principles which make up the water right”)(citation 
omitted); Farmers Res. & Irr. Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241, 245 (Colo. 
2002)(“the bundle of rights constituting a Colorado water right”)(citation omitted); 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Clinch, 158 P.3d 377, 400, n.9 (Mont. 2007) 
(“elements in the bundle of sticks recognized as a water right.”).31 
Those sticks include quantity, place of use, purpose of use, period of use, source, 
method or means of diversion, and priority. (R.404-05). See, e.g., §73-3-17(6)(Addendum 
5); Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 258 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1953)(protecting 
                                                          
29 It means “[a]n obstruction or hindrance.”  (Black’s Law Dictionary, 937 (10th ed. 2014)). 
30 Subject to eminent domain.  §10-7-4(2). 
31 A water right’s “usufructory” nature, however, distinguishes it from other real property.  
Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 185 (Mont. 2011) (citation 
omitted). “The words ‘property right’ draw to themselves and connote a bundle of old, 
sacred, absolute, and inviolate ideas of exclusivity, possession and permanence. Although 
these concepts are not alien to water law, they are not the language of water law ... 
because water law does not deal with these things, but with uses, re-uses, sharing, and 
priorities rather than exclusivity, possession or even permanence.” Id. (citation omitted).  
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source); Wayment, ¶11 (protecting diversion method).  The law protects them all.  “From 
the beginning of our history, when” water is “diverted” “and applied” “to a beneficial use,” 
the appropriator’s “right” to divert “was recognized as being prior and superior to the rights 
of all subsequent appropriators to the extent of [its] reasonable necessities ….” Justesen v. 
Olsen, 40 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1935). 
  Since then, “as new conditions presented themselves … our courts have 
consistently enforced this right of priority and protected appropriators not only as against 
all subsequent claimants taking water from the body of the stream, but as against all persons 
interfering with its source.”  Id.  See also Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 
UT 3, ¶33 n.14.32  Among these “new conditions” is growth. Utah’s population “trebled” 
since the 1960’s.  Delta Canal Co. v. [Vincent], 2013 UT 69, ¶24.  Growth requires that 
we develop “all available water.” Id.       
1. Interference was highly factual and expert driven. 
“Determinations regarding the weight” of expert witness testimony “are within the 
province of the finder of fact ….” AmericanWest Bank v. Kellin, 2015 UT App 300, ¶25 
(modified).  An expert “may not give an opinion which represents a mere guess, 
speculation, or conjecture.” State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 230 (Utah 1980). Experts may 
testify concerning “probability, possibility, or likelihood” so long as the opinion represents 
the expert’s “best judgment to a reasonable certainty.”  Id.  Helpfully, Loughlin, using all 
                                                          
32 Abrogated on other grounds by Otter Creek Res. Co. v. New Escalante Irr. Co., 2009 
UT 16, ¶¶11-13. 
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of Anderson’s data, agreed with much of Anderson’s analysis. (R.1104-06,1119,1124-
32,1139-41;P-Ex.29).  
Because Pineview’s interference occurs hundreds of feet below the ground, in the 
source where the water is, (R.1213-14), the issue was driven mostly by expert testimony. 
Groundwater presents a more difficult case “[b]ecause [it] cannot be observed nor 
measured with precision, but must be determined on the basis of geology, physics and 
hydrology.” Wayman, at 863.  In Silver Fork, for example, the city claimed that residents 
interfered with its Big Cottonwood Creek surface right. 2000 UT 3, ¶16. It lacked “actual 
measurements … illustrating that diversion of water at the mine significantly diminished 
[creek] flow ….”  Id. ¶27. This Court reasoned that interference, even with a surface right, 
does not depend on such “measurements reporting flow before and after interception of the 
water at its source.” Id.  If available, “their value is limited to the extent that other 
environmental factors dictate flow, such as season and amount of precipitation,” id., as 
Loughlin explained. (R.1101 (“water levels rise and fall seasonally”)).  
Pineview rests heavily on the lack of well pumping measurements and records.  
(Brf.13-15,27-29;R.1256-57 (“no yield data”)).  But the issue never was as narrow as 
Pineview wanted.  It seemed satisfied with Loughlin’s opinion that Appellees could 
ultimately get their water.  (R.1108-09). Between approximately October through June, 
that is true.  Between July and whenever the aquifer recovers from #4’s dewatering, 
however, that is not true.  For that entire period, as much as one-fourth of their year-round 
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right (R.1214), they went to the well, but “[t]he well was dry ….”33  (R.396,502-03,541-
42,584). Not completely dry; the water is there, possibly hundreds of feet deeper than where 
it is before #4 turns on.  (R.1113;P-Ex.54).     
2. The district court found facts showing interference. 
  The evidence of interference is compelling, and Pineview does not challenge the 
facts.  First, however, a word about Wayment. When this Court says that no one may 
diminish the quantity of another’s rights, as it did in North v. Marsh, 504 P.2d 1378, 1379 
and n.2 (Utah 1973), and where it prohibits “direct[]” and “indirect[]” interference, as in 
Rasmussen v. Moroni Irr. Co., 189 P. 572, 577 (Utah 1920), it protects each of the sticks 
in the water right bundle.  (R.404-405). The analysis breaks nicely into Wayment’s two 
prongs: “The trial court must first find facts regarding the claim of interference,” 
(accomplished here R.408-09),34 “and then,” with added emphasis, “determine whether 
those facts are within the ambit of interference as applied to the water right at issue.” 
Wayment, ¶9.  
In other words, “the water right at issue” is not only a bundle of many elements, it 
has varying features.  It can be surface or groundwater or both, for any of a variety of uses,  
measured in cfs, acre-feet, or both, storage or direct flow or both, or other distinguishing 
features. The particulars of “the water right at issue” drive the interference analysis. 
                                                          
33 Robert Frost, Going for Water, 1913 (“A Boy’s Will”).  
34 And not seriously challenged.  Pineview does not marshal on this or any fact question 
and yet insists that the court got the finding of interference wrong. To demonstrate clear 
error, Pineview must “overcome[e] the healthy dose of deference owed to factual findings” 
by “identify[ing] and deal[ing] with [the] supportive evidence,” establishing a legal 
problem in that evidence.  Nielsen, ¶¶40–41. 
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Pineview contends, however, that the district court never reached Wayment’s second prong.  
(Brf.29-33). Appellees contend that most of the case was about that second prong.   
a. Pineview interfered with the period of use. 
A water right’s period of use is “the time during which the water is to be used each 
year.” §73-3-17(1)(d).  The Appellee senior rights are year-round.  (R.1214;P-Exs.10A-
12D).35  Well #4 is turned on around July 1 each year and runs through the end of the 
irrigation season, typically through September.  (R.397,1056-57).  Interference with the 
Arave well is all but immediate, (R.396,1249), and lasts beyond #4’s shutdown due to 
aquifer recharge.  (R.401,891).  The effect on the SI well is delayed but no less crippling 
as the water disappears within #4’s “cone of depression,” draining the aquifers.  (R.961-
963). For about three months of every year, the senior rights are inaccessible while #4, with 
its junior rights, takes the water.  (R.397,399-401,408-09,1214,1223,1294).  Pineview does 
not challenge these facts. 
b. Pineview interfered with the diversion means and method. 
The senior rights are groundwater rights, approved specifically for use only from 
the Arave and SI wells.  (R.391-92). As a matter of law, the wells are the only authorized 
means and point of diversion.  (R.3-4,405;P-Exs.10-12; cf. §73-3-17(6)).  As a matter of 
fact, the wells are the only physical means. This Court has long protected diversion method 
or means.  If a junior user could render a senior user’s “diverting means or methods” 
ineffectual, by making “prior appropriations of water unavailable with impunity,” 
                                                          
35 Except for that portion of Southwick’s right permitting irrigation.  (R.391,574-75). 
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then there is in fact no such a right as a prior right, but all rights may, 
at any time, be invaded or destroyed by a subsequent appropriator by 
simply making the diverting means used by the prior appropriator 
useless. To permit such an invasion of a prior right would, in effect, 
amount to an indirect taking of a prior appropriator's water. This 
neither the legislative nor the judicial power can allow without 
permitting confiscation of property rights.   
 
Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 114 P. 147, 152 (Utah 1911)(holding in connection with surface 
rights that the original appropriator “also acquires the right to continue use of his method 
or means of diver[sion]”), relied on in Wayment, ¶13, n.10. 
Again, #4’s effects on the Arave well are swift.  According to Loughlin, Arave is “a 
good surrogate” for #4, meaning that pumping #4 is quickly detectable there.  (R.1104).  
The cascade effect then tumbles to the SI well (R.963), which is also within #4’s cone of 
depression.  (R.1226-27). Once #4 is running, the senior rights cannot be diverted with the 
only possible means and method of doing so, at least not without great difficulty for SI. 
(R.411).36  Pineview does not challenge these facts.       
c. Pineview interfered with the source. 
A water right “attaches to the point of diversion and extends to the source.”  
Meridian Ditch Co. v. Koosharem Irr. Co., 660 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah 1983)(citation 
omitted).  The “name of the stream or water source” is a required element of the certificate 
of appropriation issued by the state engineer, signifying the “right to use the water ….” 
§73-3-17(1)(e);(6).  See, e.g., Richlands Irr. Co. v. Westview Irr. Co., 80 P.2d 458, 465 
                                                          
36 Pineview obsesses over an SI pump test showing 25 gpm for 2 hours without dropping 




(Utah 1938)(water right “includes an interest in the source(s) … surface or underground.”).  
Silver Fork, ¶22, and n.6.  Silver Fork relies on Little Cottonwood, 443 and n.2, which in 
turn relies, inter alia, on Justesen: 
[O]ur courts have consistently enforced th[e] right of priority and 
protected appropriators not only as against all subsequent claimants 
taking water from the body of the stream, but as against all persons 
interfering with its source. It makes no difference whether the 
interference be with the main stream or the tributaries thereto, or 
whether the interference be with water flowing over the surface of the 
ground, flowing in subterranean streams or merely percolating 
through the ground.37 
 
Justesen, at 805; see also Wrathall v. Johnson, 40 P.2d 755, 766 (Utah 1935).38 
                                                          
37 Appellees proposed FFCL, adopted wholesale, included the following altered quote from 
Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 258 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1953):  “[N]o one can 
interfere with the source of supply of [a water right], regardless of how far it may be from 
the place of use, and whether it flows on the surface or underground, in such a manner as 
will diminish the quantity or injuriously affect the quality of the water of these established 
rights.” (R.405). Pineview is correct that the brackets replace “this stream,” but that does 
not change the meaning of the passage, and was certainly not intended to. (Brf.31). That 
“stream” was and is “fully appropriated.” Id. at 443.  The Court’s larger contextual point 
is that interference with a water right source of supply is interference with the right itself—
one of its sticks. The context of that quote is the Court’s treatment of the claim in that case 
that additional water was available for appropriation. Even so,  
such waters are unappropriated and available for appropriation if they can be 
extracted from the ground without interfering with the quantity or quality of 
water available for the use of the prior appropriators. The fact that this water 
comes from the same source of supply as the surface stream which has been 
fully appropriated, and in a sense has been appropriated as carrier water to 
bring the surface water to the diverting works, does not make it unavailable 
for appropriation if it can be beneficially used without diminishing the supply 
available for prior appropriators.”  
Id. 444 (emphasis added).  The Court’s footnote 2 in that paragraph is a string cite to several 
cases explaining that source is among a water right’s protected elements.  That is all we 
intended with the bracketed “a water right”—shorthand for the larger point Little 
Cottonwood and many other cases make. See, e.g., Silver Fork, ¶33, n.10. 
38 The holdings in Justesen and Wrathall were codified in 1935 to include groundwater in 
the state’s public waters available for appropriation “subject to existing rights.” §73-1-1(1). 




Explaining death by a thousand cuts, Rasmussen observed that “[i]f a “landowner 
and water user [] cut[s] off a[] source of supply, and so on until all the sources of supply 
which pass underneath the surface of the soil are cut off . . . the lower and prior appropriator 
would be left without any, or at least only a meager, supply of water in the low-water 
season. This may not legally be done.” Id. 577. Similarly, in Gardner, concerning rights in 
Utah Lake, this Court held that “[u]nder no condition should [a subsequent appropriator] 
be permitted to take water from the lake [the source of supply] until they can do so without 
interfering with … prior rights.”  Id. 153. 
Peterson v. Wood, 262 P. 828, 831 (Utah 1927), practically reverses the burden of 
proof when a junior right takes or threatens water out of priority to the senior right’s 
detriment: “The rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that whoever claims he has 
developed water in close proximity to the source … previously appropriated by others, is 
charged with the burden of proving that his alleged development of water does not interfere 
with the waters theretofore appropriated.” Cf. Searle, ¶2 (change applicant must 
demonstrate “reason to believe” no impairment of existing rights). 
 Anderson explained, Loughlin admitted, and the district court found the direct effect 
on the Arave well, and the delayed or “baffled” effect on the SI Well.  (R.400-01,961-
62,1124-26,1129,1130-31,1133,1135-36,1138,1142-45).39 Loughlin agreed concerning 
Arave, (R.1125-26), but testified, incredibly it turns out, that the SI well taps its own 
                                                          
39 Anderson explained that the mere fact that “water [is] available” in the aquifer still leaves 




aquifer, (R.1164-65), and its problems (which did not exist before #4, R.398,541,605), are 
self-inflicted. (R.1110-1112). He had an analytical problem, however. Admitting that both 
wells are inside #4’s cone of depression, (R1130-31;P-Ex.29), he had to find a way to 
isolate SI.  To do that, he postulated an “aquitard” of some unknown nature, size, and 
location that sealed off SI from everything, evidently, including the dewatering effect of 
#4’s cone of depression. (R.1121,1124,1232-33).   
Loughlin’s speculation about SI’s own aquifer took him well beyond anything the 
data could support.  He was impeached into admitting that SI and Arave communicate, and 
that if that’s true, then #4 and SI must also communicate.  (R.1130-1146,1239-40).  By 
assuming the aquitard he needed, he stopped doing the “geology” expected by Wayman 
and switched to economics.  City of Los Angeles v. U.S. DOT, 179 F.3d 937, 940, n.1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999)(“How does an economist escape from a 25 foot hole? Answer: Assume a 
ladder.”).40 
B. Bingham’s holding regarding groundwater does not apply. 
A centerpiece of Pineview’s argument about source is Bingham (Brf.24-25). 
Pineview argues that (1) Bingham articulates the correct “interference analysis,” and (2) it 
applies here because it says, minus Pineview’s double emphasis, that plaintiffs there had 
“no protectable interest in the level of water in the soil beneath their land,” and “no such 
                                                          
40 Pineview asserts that “Loughlin explained in detail the lack of a correlation between [#4] 
and the [SI well] …[giving reasons].” (Brf.17). Actually, he was, at best, confused.  He 
had already admitted in deposition that SI and Arave communicate, and that Arave and #4 
communicate, and if so then SI and #4 must also communicate. (R.1142-45,1133,1138), 
all of which is happening inside #4’s cone of depression. (R.1130-31,1129;P-Ex.29). Still, 
he insisted on “zero communication” between SI and #4. (R.1138-39). 
 
35 
enforceable right … to their soil saturation or the level of the water table.” (Brf.25;2010 
UT 37, ¶12).  Bingham does not help Pineview.  That case explains exactly why those 
plaintiffs stood in very different legal shoes than Appellees. Clarifying the interference 
claim, this Court distinguished Bingham from this case: 
[interference] can be invoked only by a party with an enforceable 
water right. Our prior discussion with regard to the nature of the North 
Hayden Group's property interest makes clear that its members have 
no such enforceable right with regard to their soil saturation or the 




 Not only does each Appellee have “an enforceable water right,” they are the senior 
rights in the source (R.392,408-09), which unlike the Bingham plaintiffs, happens to be the 
groundwater beneath their homes, (R.406,1222), and the same water #4 extracts first only 
because it has a longer, more powerful straw. (R.399-400,409). Appellees’ “[s]ource of 
supply” is “[u]nderground water” from a “(well).” (P-Exs.10A,11A,12D). The Bingham 
plaintiffs had no such rights; they benefitted only indirectly from groundwater. Id. ¶6.  Not 
so here.  These plaintiffs own senior rights pumped from wells captured and invaded by 
Pineview’s junior water diversion and the large cone of depression (between a quarter and 
a half mile in diameter) it creates.  (R.1146;P-Ex.29).  
Pineview again doubly emphasizes Bingham’s statement that interference requires 
some act “obstructing or hindering [a plaintiff’s] ability to obtain that water.” (Brf.24-
25;2010 UT 37, ¶48).  “[T]hat water” is the “water to which the prior appropriator is 
entitled.” Bingham, ¶48 (citation omitted).  And that is the point of this case.  That water 
Pineview pumps hundreds of feet below Appellees’ wells is the very same “[u]nderground” 
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water on which Appellees have the senior call. (R.392,408-09; (e.g., P-Ex.10A); §73-3-
1(5)(a)).  Pineview’s well operation plainly obstructs and hinders their access to it.  (R.406-
09). Pineview does not challenge these facts.      
Bingham also points out that plaintiffs there were “capable of obtaining all of the 
water to which they are entitled in the same manner in which they have been diverting it.”  
Bingham, ¶53.  Pineview argues that, because Appellees’ wells are capable of producing 
their allotted water, there can be no interference.  Those wells can indeed produce that 
water, and more, but only when #4 is off.  Appellees cannot “obtain” their water via their 
wells (the “manner in which they have been diverting it”) as long as #4 pumps, 
approximately one-fourth of the year.  (R.397,399-401,408-09,1214,1223,1294).   
C. Improper water use is not a defense to interference in this case. 
SI overused its right.  (R.398,410-411).  It and Araves put water on some lawn and 
flowers but should not have.  (R.398,1213).  Curing that problem (with aid of new counsel), 
Venture acquired an additional to 2 acre-feet.  (R.398,607-08).  The district court noted 
correctly that water use is “regulated by the Utah State Engineer, who has enforcement 
powers pursuant to §73-2-25 if water is used without the right to do so, or beyond an 
existing right.”41  (R.411).  
Pineview contends that “illegal” use, (Brf.38-39), is a complete defense to the fact 
of interference that its expert admits Pineview caused.  (R.1130-46,1239-40).  As the 
                                                          
41 “[T]he state engineer may commence an enforcement action … if [he] finds that a person 




district court noted, nothing about this case or the evidence of interference would be 
different if SI had stayed within the limits of its pre-augmented right.  (R.410-11). Had any 
Appellee used a little less water between January and June, or between October and 
January, the interference is the same because between July and the end of September the 
wells will not work. Id.42  When #4 was on, SI needed the Arave lifeline just to keep its 
cistern filled.  (R.542-43). That’s why Pineview connected the Inn. Furthermore, now that 
Venture has acquired the water sufficient for SI’s “needs,” there is no doubt that Pineview’s 
interference will not change.  #4’s cone of depression that invaded Appellees’ source 
before Venture made things right with the state engineer returns each time #4 pumps.  
Pineview skirts around its admitted interference, (Brf.14-15,37), instead pointing 
out that Appellees exceeded their rights and could have obtained more data than they did. 
True both times. First, in this case, the nature of the interference did not affect how 
Appellees’ used their rights.  That’s what Wayment means when it focuses the analysis “on 
the water right at issue.”  Pineview’s interference does not affect that particular stick in the 
bundle—the “purpose” of use.  §73-3-17(1)(c). And quantity is not an issue when #4 is 
off. (R.398,540-41,577,582,605).  Second, regarding data, with an unlimited budget we 
could learn a lot about the “geology” of these aquifers.  Appellees spent the money to 
understand them sufficient to prove the interference, (R.635,654-55,783), with an assist 
from Loughlin. (P-Ex.29; supra at 21-23). 
                                                          
42 Pineview had standing to counterclaim if it could have shown that overuse by senior 
rights interfered with its junior rights.  Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1).  Failure to file a compulsory 
counterclaim “result[s in a waiver.” Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
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D. The finding of negligence is proper. 
Negligence requires (1) a “duty” owed by Pineview to Appellees, (2) its breach, (3) 
a finding that “the breach …was the proximate cause of [Appellees’] injury, and (4) 
“damages” “in fact.” Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993).  Bingham invoked 
another Justice Crockett opinion, N.M. Long & Co. v. Cannon-Papanikolas Construction, 
343 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1959), where this Court “weighed the rights of a landowner and a 
water rights holder,” Bingham, at ¶61.43  “What is important … [is] whether the actions 
that caused that change were reasonable and undertaken with due care for the rights of 
others.” Id.  Accordingly, “every person has a right to use his own property … so long as 
that use does not invade” neighboring “rights” “unreasonably and substantially.”  Id. ¶61 
(citation and emphasis omitted).  
“Invade” describes vividly what Loughlin drew (P-Ex.29), what Anderson 
explained, (P-Exs.14-30), and what the district court found. (R.478-79,1130-31,1035).  
Pineview’s #4 was pump tested in 2004, and the interference with Arave was quick and 
thorough.  (R.396,504).  A second pump test that year confirmed it.  Id.  Then, in 2007, 
when there is no doubt that #4 was Pineview’s responsibility, (R.396,577), it put that well 
into service, quickly shutting down Araves’ well, resulting in their and Southwick’s 
immediate connection to Pineview’s culinary system.  (R.396-97,505,1256-57).  SI joined 
them in August. (R.542-43). Pineview pumped knowing, or it should have known, that its 
                                                          
43 The reasoning in N.M. Long is “fully applicable to a claim to prevent actions that might 
lower the water table.”  The pressures of growth and the need for water, “and the 
corresponding necessity for restrictions upon the manner in which property rights may be 
exercised,” increase with time.  Bingham, at ¶62. 
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well interfered with nearby senior rights.  Pineview’s “method” of diversion “foreseeably” 
harmed Appellees. See Bingham, at ¶65.  Appellee’s “damages” consist, first, in the loss 
of their water rights and wells and the independence that comes with those property rights. 
(R.401-03,441).   
E. The district court imposed proper remedies. 
This is a case about discretion, and specifically the size of the “pasture” in which a 
district court may roam for the principles necessary to reconcile inherently competitive 
principles.  The first rule is priority—as “[b]etween appropriators, the one first in time is 
first in rights.” §73-3-1(5)(a).  A senior right is entitled to its full complement “before 
junior” rights get anything. Heal Utah v. Kane Cnty. Water Conservancy Dist., 2016 UT 
App 153, ¶6. “Beneficial use” is, in turn, “the basis, the measure and the limit” of a water 
right.  §73-1-3.  Embedded within beneficial use is the “desideratum of our water law”—
to develop as much of the “available water” as possible without waste.  Wayman, at 867.  
“The duty to” avoid waste is bound up with the objective of achieving “the greatest duty 
possible for the quantity of water available …. regardless of … priority ….” In re Water 
Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 348 P.2d 679, 682 (Utah 1960). The objective 
is always and everywhere to “assure the greatest possible use of the natural resource.”  Id. 







1. The district court has broad discretion to fashion Wayman remedies. 
 
Because we live in a desert, the legislature and this Court have “fashioned” water 
law “in recognition of the desirability and of the necessity of insuring the highest possible 
development and of the most continuous beneficial use of all available water with as little 
waste as possible.”  Wayman, at 862.  In that statement, this Court recognized the inherent 
tension between the rules of priority and beneficial use.  On one hand, priority is 
everything—“the one first in time is first in rights.” §73-3-1(5)(a).44 On the other hand, it 
is not everything.  It shares equal footing with the need to develop as much water as we 
can.  Wayman, at 867. 
Finding interference was not the district court’s toughest task.  The evidence was 
practically lopsided.(R.396,398,399-403,406-10,411-12,440,502-05,582-83,592,891,961-
63,1214,1223,1249,1294;P-Exs.23,26,27,29,30,40). Pineview’s expert placed both 
Appellee wells, with their senior rights, inside #4’s cone of depression, which dewaters 
both aquifers. (P-Exs.29,52;R.1130-31).  
The difficulty was fashioning a remedy that honors priority while following 
Wayman’s broad instruction to develop as much water as possible.  Pineview contends that 
the district court “announce[d] a dramatic departure from established ground water law 
…,” (Brf.1), and “failed to correctly apply the law.” (Brf.2). If affirmed, Pineview warns, 
the decision “would upend decades of established law relating to groundwater 
administration.”  (Brf.3). Pineview sees the decision as a “guarantee [of] a particular level 
                                                          
44  For example, when adopted, Utah’s Constitution “recognized and confirmed” “[a]ll 
existing” water rights “for any useful or beneficial purpose.” Utah Const. Art. XVII, §1. 
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of water in the water table” for “the most senior right.”  Id. It argues that the judgment 
“guarantees the water level in the Arave Well is always higher than” in SI.  (Brf.40).  
That is incorrect. The remedy only begins there, returning these rights to their proper 
priority now that interference is established. The district court has that discretion.  The 
court further ordered cooperation and data collection to determine whether there is an 
optimum point where all the rights can be satisfied while honoring Appellees’ priority.  
(R.411-13,440-41).  But that is not the end of the story. 
Decided in 1969, Wayman is cited in a handful of published decisions but never 
substantively applied. This may be the first post-Wayman well interference case to reach 
this Court.  Wayman’s “rule of reasonableness” in allocating rights in groundwater 
“involves an analysis of the total situation: the quantity of water available, the average 
annual recharge in the basin, [and] the existing rights and their priorities.”  Wayman, at 
865 (emphasis added).   “What is desirable,” and what the district court tried to do here,  
is the best possible adjustment of the rights of these parties in 
relationship to each other, and without undue or unreasonable burden 
upon either, and at the same time serve the desideratum of our water 
law of putting and keeping to the beneficial use the greatest possible 
amount of available water. 
  
Id. at 867.     
Pineview proposes, instead, that these senior right owners should “chase their 
water,” (Brf.39-40), not because of drought or other natural forces, but because Pineview’s 
longer straw diverts its junior rights using a well several times more powerful and hundreds 
of feet deeper, taking all the water, effectively reversing priority in its favor.  (R.395-
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96,408).45  Our remedy, says Pineview, is to just drill deeper, and to keep drilling, 
presumably at our cost, until we catch up to its cone of depression. This Court in another 
Justice Crockett opinion already rejected this appropriator-with-the-longest-straw-and-
most-money-wins “chase” to the bottom:   
It must be realized that underground water basins do not emerge from 
some mysterious inexhaustible source. They are replenished only 
from natural precipitation and surface waters. Prudent management of 
water resources requires that only the average annual recharge be 
withdrawn. To do otherwise simply results in competitive chasing the 
water level down by ever deeper wells. 
  
Fairfield Irr. Co. v. White, 416 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1966).46   
2. The district court wisely left room to adjust remedies.  
Despite a lack of substantive judicial gloss on Wayman, this case is not this Court’s 
first rodeo on similar issues.  Decided a few years before Wayman, Fairfield shows just 
how right our district court is.  There, Fairfield had senior rights in certain spring flow. Id. 
642. It sought an injunction against a landowner and a church from pumping their wells 
(two to three miles away), which caused decreased spring flow. Id. Tests showed, just like 
they do here, that when the wells were pumped spring flow dropped, and when the wells 
                                                          
45 Appellees agree that they and all appropriators must “chase their water” when the source 
retreats or dries due to natural conditions.  In California, where many of its groundwater 
basins are overdrafted due to drought, “extractors must dig deeper wells” when “the water 
table drops.” Kelly Hart, The Mojave Desert as Grounds for Change: Clarifying Property 
Rights in California's Groundwater to Make Extraction Sustainable Statewide, 9 Hastings 
W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol'y 31, 34 (2002).  Here, however, the experts agreed that the 
drainage is not in general decline, but is stable, with normal seasonal fluctuations. 
(R.393,779-81,809-11,963,1129;P-Exs.26,27). 
46 And at whose expense?  Certainly not Appellees’.  Cf. Andrews, 533 (“reasonable basis” 
for interfering parties to “share equally” in the “expense” to make senior rights whole).   
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were off, spring flow returned “almost immediately,” indicating, as similar tests did here, 
a shared source.  Id. 643.  
The district court there enjoined some of the well pumping and ordered replacement 
water. Id. 642. It declined to enjoin the church “but retained jurisdiction to take further 
evidence … as to any such interference.” Id.;cf. R.412,440,442).47  Wayman does not 
address a specific remedy in the event of local well interference; for example, whether the 
senior right must drill deeper.  The fact-driven “rule of reasonableness” may in the right 
case indicate that remedy, just not here, at least because (1) #4 is 500+ feet deeper, so 
Appellees should not have to pay for it, and (2) it’s a bad idea. Fairfield, at 645. 
 The result Pineview says upends all of our groundwater law—the district court’s 
experimental, data-gathering, retained jurisdiction remedy designed to further water 
development while protecting senior rights—bears a striking resemblance to Fairfield’s, 
where this Court explained, previewing Wayman:  
This is in conformity with the policy of the law of encouraging and 
promoting the development and use of water resources and of not 
interfering therewith unless it is clearly shown that doing so infringes 
some established prior water right. Nevertheless, due to lack of 
certainty about the matter the trial court acted wisely in retaining 
jurisdiction to further consider the possibility of such a relationship 
after more tests and observations have been made; and if any such 
relationship is found to exist, to grant appropriate relief. 
 
Id. 646 (emphasis added).48     
                                                          
47 Experts in Fairfield testified that a geologic barrier separated the church’s aquifer from 
that of the company and the landowner. Fairfield, 646.  That testimony was, evidently and 
unlike Loughlin’s, persuasive. Id.  
48 Justice Crockett dissented in Current Creek v. Andrews, 344 P.2d 528,533-38 (Utah 
1959), because he thought the remedy too harsh, and wrote Fairfield and Wayman, 
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The district court in Fairfield and here “wisely” left itself room to adjust remedies 
to fit the data, virtually all of which Appellees paid Anderson to collect, that Loughlin 
relied on, (R.1106), and that Pineview now criticizes. The district court here did precisely 
what Fairfield and Wayman require—ordered data in an effort to adjust the rights to each 
other and the “available water,” Wayman, 862, and left its options open, including, “[i]f … 
#4 cannot be pumped at a level or rate that does not interfere … the court may order … 
replacement water … at [Pineview’s] sole expense.” (R.441)(emphasis added), citing §73-
3-23. Cf. Andrews, 531-33 (replacement water ordered).49 
3. The district court needs flexibility and options.   
A district court tasked with a “rule of reasonableness” in the allocation of rights in 
the use of groundwater has and must have room to roam, to experiment. This Court laid 
that groundwork in Pena, establishing a durable framework for how to think about what 
district courts do. The “pasture” in which all courts below this one are permitted depends 
on the nature of the issue.  Levin, ¶24.  Narrow fences define pure legal questions. Id.  On 
the other end, the pasture is wide, allowing continuing jurisdiction and innovation. Id. This 
is that case. 
                                                          
distinguishing Andrews in Wayman. 458 P.2d at 863, n.3. That distinction is important.  
Wayman was a §73-3-3 change application case involving existing wells and a plentiful 
source. Wayman, 863. Like this case (at least with respect to Appellee’s local aquifer), 
Andrews was a “new withdrawal” from the source.  Id., and n.3. 
49 Pineview’s #4 is just one of five wells approved for use at the same time as #4. (P-Exs32-
33), a fact that the district court considered in evaluating its, and Pineview’s, options.  
(R413 at ¶iii; 441 at ¶iii). 
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District courts employing Wayman must do what only courts of equity can do, which 
is to figure out how to stretch a finite resource as far as possible while honoring priority. 
(R.406-07). Wayman, at 865; Fairfield, at 646. To do that, they need flexibility—a wide 
pasture—to deal with unique facts, party resources, and the “ambit of interference as 
applied to the water right at issue.” Wayment, ¶9.   
In Wayman, supply was not a problem. “The underground basin involved [there] 
still ha[d] an abundant supply of water.” Wayman, 863.50  Here, supply is an issue.  The 
“drainage area,” (P-Ex.10A), in which these rights exist is “fully appropriated.” 
(Addendum 4).  And, Wayman did not involve “a new withdrawal in a basin which 
adversely affects the flow of wells prior in time and right.” Wayman, 863. (emphasis in 
original).  There, the city only improved existing wells.  Id., 864.  A “new withdrawal” is, 
however, what happened here. (R.390).  #4 is a new straw drilled hundreds of feet below 
existing diversion points in an already fully appropriated drainage where Appellee’s senior 
rights and wells functioned just fine until Pineview showed up. (R.390,396,408).51 These 
facts are closer to Andrews and Fairfield than to Wayman, but Wayman’s “rule” applies.52    
                                                          
50 The area was then still open to appropriation.  See 
https://waterrights.utah.gov/docSys/v919/w919/w919009g.pdf at 29. 
51 By way of illustration, the state engineer’s Salt Lake Valley Groundwater Management 
Plan urges that new wells “should be designed, constructed, and operated so that, when 
pumped at its maximum flow rate, it will not cause more than 12 feet of draw down on an 
existing well unless the owner of the new well provides just compensation to the affected 
well owner(s).” 
See https://waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/mmplan/ugw/slf/slvmgpln.pdf, at §4.0. 
52 Wayman was a §73-3-3 change application case, but Fairfield was not, and Andrews is 
a blend, involving state engineer decisions and other complex claims.  Andrews, 530.           
Yet the remedies are similar in the sense that they are adapted to their respective facts, 
suggesting that the problems they addressed, that are present here, and that are sure to 
 
46 
The district court ordered #4 shut down or curtailed followed by testing to find the 
sweet spot where all three wells can, hopefully, co-exist.  (R.412-13,440-41).  Pineview’s 
criticism of the district court’s step-at-a-time remedy might mean something had it 
proposed Wayman-style remedies of its own.  Instead, it proposed that Araves could set a 
pump deeper in the well, (R.278,296,332,346), starting the very “chase” this Court rejected 
in Fairfield fifty-two years ago.  Perhaps with more data lowered pumps or deeper wells 
could work.  The district court’s retained jurisdiction “in aid of its judgment” preserves its 
discretion when that data comes.   
Bereft of any other ideas for remedying its admitted interference, Pineview asked 
for its “attorney’s fees and costs” based on alternate grounds, first for “injuries caused by 
diversion of water in violation of an existing right.” §73-2-28(4). It made no such 
counterclaim and has no such injuries. Its other grounds were that this action is “without 
merit and not … in good faith.”  §78B-5-825. (R.295,350-52).  The record, passim, resolves 
that. Pineview’s expert admitted interference and all the predicate facts supporting it. 
(R.1124-26,1129-33,1136,1138-46,1156-57,1159-60;P-Ex.29).53  
                                                          
follow, will be addressed in a consistent fashion.  These cases are and ever will be “so 
complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing” all of them “can be spelled out.” 
Pena, at 939.  Wayman’s “rule” is about as precise as the Court can get without risking the 
unintended consequences of an overly restrictive pasture.  
53 For the same reasons, the Court should dispense with Pineview’s fee request here.  
(Brf.47-48). Seeking fees and summing up its entire appellate argument, Pineview 
contends that Appellees “offered no proof of the amount of authorized water that they 
[were] unable to obtain when” #4 pumps.  (Id. 47).  Pineview skips over that part of the 
case in which we proved with Loughlin’s help that between July 1 and the end of the 
irrigation season, the Arave well pumps nothing, and the SI well cannot keep up. 
(R.397,399-401,408-09,1214,1223,1294).  Without the lifeline from the Arave home (by 
then a Pineview customer), the Inn could not have functioned. (R.542-43). In these 
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4. The district court appropriately awarded damages based on fees paid 
to Pineview. 
 
A senior right is “first in rights.” §73-3-1(5)(a).  In an underground aquifer shared 
with junior rights, therefore, the senior rights get the first water out of the ground. In other 
words, the senior Appellee rights divert first in priority, before junior Pineview gets a drop.  
Pineview’s #4 reversed that order. (R.407-09;P-Exs.23,24,26,27,29).  Once it was clear to 
the parties that #4 interfered, Pineview immediately connected Appellees so it could go 
right on using #4.  (R.397,505,1256-57).  In exchange, Appellees paid a flat $20 monthly, 
(R.397,505,550-51), a cheap rate that presumably accounted for the interference.  When 
Pineview changed that deal, Appellees sued, seeking to abate the interference and damages.  
(R.505-06).54   
Appellees were required to prove both the fact of damages and their amount.  See 
TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 2008 UT 81, ¶15. The “fact of damages” means “a 
reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage.” Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). Evidence for the amount 
                                                          
unchallenged facts are found multiple instances of interference: (1) the period of use, (2) 
the quantity (0% from Arave and some negligible amount from SI, (R.397,399-401,408-
09;P-Exs.23,24,26,27,29,30), and (3) the diversion method—the wells either do not work 
or barely work. Id. These facts added up to “obstructing or hindering the quantity or quality 
of” “existing water right[s],” Wayment, ¶13; (R.409), and explain their connection to 
Pineview. That’s exactly what happens when your cone of depression captures existing 
wells—that “trouble” Laughlin helpfully described—pumping water to such a level as to 
interfere with someone else’s right. (R.1122).  
54 Appellees’ water rights add significant value to their properties. (See R.406). Without 
water, land loses tremendous, sometimes all, value. See, e.g., Sanpete America v. 
Willardsen, 2011 UT 48, ¶40, and cases cited, discussing water’s importance to land value.  
Their water rights are appurtenant. See discussion at id. ¶¶36-48. 
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must “provide[] a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages.”  
TruGreen, ¶15. 
Understanding the water right pecking order, the district court awarded Appellees 
what they’ve paid Pineview for, in effect, their own water. (R.401-02,413,441).55  That is, 
their senior rights gave them the first water out of these shared, fully appropriated aquifers.  
Pineview’s deeper well took that water first, right out from under them, reversing priority 
in fact, (R.407-09;P-Exs.23,24,26,27,29), thereby interfering with the priority stick.56  
They did not pay for water before that, but they had to afterwards.  They should not have 
to pay for water they already appropriated and on which they have the senior call.  Finally, 
the district court’s award of damages for the hard water and related problems was entirely 
appropriate.  Just like their pre-#4 well use, they had no such problems before connecting. 
(R.398,1223).57  
CONCLUSION 
 The essential facts of this case could never be disputed.  Pineview operated a new, 
much bigger well too close to existing wells that divert senior rights. Finding clear 
interference, the district court ordered a proportional remedy that faithfully honors those 
                                                          
55 Appellees do not “own” the water, of course; they own the right to use it, and their 
priority puts them first in line.  §73-3-1(5)(a). 
56 “[P]riority in a water right is property in itself….[T]o deprive a person of” “priority is to 
deprive” “a most valuable property right.” Colorado Water Cons. Brd. v. City of Central, 
125 P.3d 424, 434 (Col. 2005)(citations omitted). 
57 It was not Appellees’ burden to figure out why Pineview’s water caused their damage.  
It just does.  Neither do they control or even know which of the “multiple sources,” 
(R.1237), Pineview uses at a given time. 
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facts. That remedy does no violence to groundwater law.  It furthers it.  This Court should 
affirm.  
August 21, 2018 MABEY WRIGHT & JAMES, PLLC 
_____________________________ 
David C. Wright 
John H. Mabey, Jr. 
Counsel for Appellees  
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Case No. 130907544 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
Roger B Arave and Kimberly L 
Arave, Janet Southwick, 
Trustee, and Venture 
Development Group, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Pineview West Water 




Civil No. 130907544 
Judge Ernie W Jones 
This action was tried to the bench August 18, 19, and 29, with closing 
arguments on September 25, 2017. Plaintiffs were represented by David C. 
Wright. Defendants were represented by Edwin C. Barnes and Emily E. Lewis. 
The parties also filed trial briefs. The court heard testimony from the witnesses, 
including expert witnesses from both sides, and has reviewed the trial exhibits. 
The court also heard argument from counsel. After the close of the evidence, the 
court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Having listened to the testimony, reviewed the evidence, and applying the 
law concerning water right interference and negligence, the court makes the 
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following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. The parties 
1. Plaintiffs Roger B. Arave and Kimberly L. Arave, individuals and husband and 
wife (referred to jointly as flAraves"), are joint tenant owners and residents of a 
single family residential real property located in Weber County, with a street 
address of 1364 North Highway 158, Eden, Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Janet Southwick, Trustee, (sometimes referred to herein as 
"Southwick"), is the sole owner and resident of certain single family residential 
real property located in Weber County, with a street address of 1375 North 
Highway 158, Eden, Utah. 
3. Venture Development Group, LLC ("Venture"), owns certain improved real 
property located in Weber County, with a street address of 1315 North Highway 
158, Eden, Utah, which property is operated as a commercial bed-and-breakfast 
known as the Snowberry Inn ("SI"). The Inn includes nine bedrooms and 
bathrooms and two kitchens. SI also serves as the year-round residence for the 
Inn operator, Andrea Burk. 
4. Defendant Pineview West Water Company (flPWWC" or "Pineview") is a 
private, Utah non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Eden, 
Weber County, Utah. PWWC is regulated by the Public Service Commission. It 
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operates multiple wells and other sources for its culinary and secondary 
(irrigation) water delivery purposes. 
B. The parties' wells 
5. Three wells are at issue: 
a. Plaintiffs Arave and Southwick share the Arave well, which was drilled 
in 1963 (and cleaned out in 2013). 
b. Venture Development owns the rights in the well operated by 
Snowberry Inn, a bed and breakfast establishment near the Araves (liS I well"), 
drilled in 2001 .
1 
i. The 81 well operates with a cistern, which is a tank with a 
functional capacity of between approximately 300 gallons and 500 gallons. 
ii. The cistern contains level sensors. When the cistern drops below 
a certain level, it triggers the SI well pump to turn on. 
iii. The pump runs until a sensor signals that the cistern is full, 
which then turns off the pump. 
iv. Water is then pumped again, with a separate pump, into the Inn, 
where it is held in two tanks, which then distribute the water throughout 
the Inn. 
I The current SI Well is a newer well. The original was drilled in 1960 and then 
replaced in 2001 
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v. Although the original Venture water right did not allow irrigation 
use, the Inn irrigated approximately 4600 square feet of lawn and garden 
around the structure. 
vi. The 81 well pump is rated at 25 gallons per minute. 
vii. The 81 and Arave wells are in hydrological communication. 
viii. The 81 well pump was rated at 25 gallons per minute when 
installed in 2001. The same pump is presently in the well. 
ix. The 81 well, which replaced a previous well drilled in 1960, was 
drilled into both the unconsolidated and bedrock aquifers, while the old 
well was completed in just the unconsolidated aquifer. 
c. The third well is PWWC's #4 Well (UPWWC #4," or just U#4"), drilled in 
2004. 
i. The #4 is approximately 700 feet from the Arave well and 
approximately 460 feet from the 81 well. 
ii. The Arave and 81 Wells are approximately 200 feet apart. 
iii. PWWC #4 is used solely for secondary irrigation water. 
iv. The current #4 pump is rated at 100 gallons per minute. 
c. The parties' water rights 
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6. Roger and Kimberly Arave own appurtenant water right 35-1483, which allows 
them to divert from their well .015 cfs (approximately 6.7 gallons per minute) for 
the needs of one home and two Iivestock.2 
7. Janet Southwick owns appurtenant water right 35-6733 (E1349) allowing her 
to divert from the Arave well up to 1 acre-foot ("af') to irrigate .25 acres and for 
the . indoor domestic needs of one home. 
8. Prior to its shutdown and use as a monitoring well, the Arave well was the sole 
source of culinary and secondary water for Araves and Southwick. 
9. Venture Development owns the property and building where Snowberry Inn 
operates. It owns two appurtenant water rights that were diverted from the SI 
Well on its property: 
a. Water right 35-1220 allows SI to divert .45 af, at the rate of .015 cubic 
feet per second (Ucfs"), for single family domestic use. 
b. Water right 35-13204 (E5647), acquired in March 2017, allows diversion 
up to 2 af to irrigate .25 acres and 1.25 af of commercial use at the Inn. 
2 "The standard unit of measurement of the flow of water shall be the discharge of 
one cubic foot per second of time, which shall be known as a second-foot; and 
the standard unit of measurement of the volume of water shall be the acre-foot, 
being the amount of water upon an acre covered one foot deep, equivalent to 
43,560 cubic feet." Utah Code §73-1-2. In these findings and conclusions, cubic 
feet per second is abbreviated as "cfs," and acre-foot is abbreviated as "af." 
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10. PWWC owns (among others) water right 35-11891 (E4625), allowing it 
to divert 90 af annually for irrigation of 21.66 acres and the indoor domestic 
requirements of 55 families ("PWWC Right"). 
a. In 2006, PWWC received State Engineer approval to divert this water 
right from any combination of five wells, including #4. 
b. That approval is, as all such approvals are under the law of prior 
appropriation, "subject to prior rights." 
11. PWWC right 35-7263 was modified by change application a27794, 
approved in 2013, allowing PWWC to divert 78 af at .33 cfs from the same five 
wells as E4625 (35-11891).3 
12. PWWC can pump its water from anyone, or any combination, of the 
five wells. 
13. The parties' relative water right priorities are as follows: 
a. Venture (SI) is October 10,1960. 
b. Arave is October 14, 1963. 
c. Southwick is August 25, 1978. 
d. PWWC #4 is October 14, 2005. 
14. Thus, all of plaintiffs' rights are senior to PWWC's Well #4 rights. 
) The "E" designation included with the Southwick, SI, and PWWC rights indicates 
simply that an exchange of water was approved. See Utah Code §73-3-20. The 
exchanges themselves are not at issue. 
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D. The local aquifers 
15. There are two relevant local aquifers, an unconsolidated or alluvial aquifer, 
which consists mostly of sand, gravel, and cobble, and a consolidated rock 
aquifer, known as the Norwood Tuff. 
16. Permeability is a measure of the ability of a porous material, such as rock or 
an unconsolidated material, to allow fluids to pass through it. 
17. The unconsolidated aquifer has much higher permeability than the Norwood, 
which has generally poor permeability. 
18. The Norwood can be fractured, which increases its permeability. The area 
around the three wells at issue likely contains fracturing, but the intensity and 
extent of fracturing are not determined. 
19. There has not been a general decline in groundwater levels in the regional 
basin in which these aquifers are located. There are, however, seasonal 
fluctuations, with lower water levels in the late summer and early autumn, 
followed by increasing water levels during recharge in the winter and spring. 
20. Aquifer recharge depends primarily on the amount of water withdrawn by well 
pumping and how quickly the aquifer begins to recharge with winter precipitation. 
E. The effect of well pumping 
21. Well pumping is a cause of seasonal discharge of water from an aquifer and 
consequent groundwater decline in a given aquifer. 
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22. When a well is drilled for production purposes, such as the three wells in this 
case, its casing is perforated at one or more depths. Water enters the well from 
the surrounding aquifer through these perforations, which supplies water to any 
pumps in the wells, when turned on. 
23. Water flows from high pressure to low pressure or, in other words, from high 
head to low head. 
24. When a well is pumped, the water level drops and a pOint of low pressure is 
created at the depth of the perforations in the well casing, which is at its 
maximum at the location of the pump itself. This has the effect of causing the 
water in the aquifer to draw down, flowing toward the pump or lower pressure. 
25. The pumping thus creates a zone of low pressure, resulting in a cone of 
depression, usefully described as follows in Bingham v. Roosevelt City, 2010 UT 
37, 113, 235 P.3d 730: 
The underground area of reduced soil saturation is in the shape of an 
inverted cone, with the point of the cone extending downward toward the point at 
which the water is extracted. Accordingly, the depth of the water table will be 
most significantly impacted at the point of extraction, but even as one moves 
away from this point, the water table will be lower than it otherwise might be. 
Therefore, the effects on the water table are apparent even on parcels of land 
that are not immediately adjacent to the wells. 
26. A cone of depression creates a "radius of influence," a zone that is measured 
from the well outward and represents an area within a given aquifer that is 
dewatered due to well pumping. 
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27. An illustration of a simple cone of depression and a radius of influence is 
depicted below. This drawing is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended 
to depict any particular cone of depression from any well in this case. (Cf. Pitt. 
Trial Exhibit 52). 
28. The shape and reach of a cone of depression depends on several factors, 
such as the nature, depth, and permeability of the surrounding aquifer(s). 
29. The Arave Well is 187 feet deep. Its perforations are from 140 to 170 feet 
deep, entirely in the Norwood Tuff. 
30. The original 81 well, drilled in 1960 and replaced in 2001, was 120 feet deep. 
When it was abandoned, its static water level was at 55 feet from the top of the 
well casing. That well was drilled into the unconsolidated aquifer. 
31. The current 81 Well is 133 feet deep. Its perforations are from 105 to 125 feet 
deep, and are in both the unconsolidated aquifer and the Norwood Tuff. When 
drilled, its static water level was at 54 feet from the top of the well casing, which 
is one foot higher in water level than the original well. 
32. The 81 well likely gets the majority of its water from the unconsolidated 
aquifer but is hydrologically connected to the Norwood Tuff aquifer. The new well 
had a specific capacity during the initial pump test, much higher than the old well, 
which was exclusively completed in unconsolidated deposits. 
33. PWWC #4 is 738 feet deep. It has four perforated zones. Zone 1 is from 58 to 
98 feet deep, which zone is divided between the unconsolidated aquifer and the 
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Nerweed Tuff. Zene 2 is frem 208 to. 228 feet deep. Zene 3 is from 408 to. 448 
feet deep, and Zene 4 is 648 to. 738 feet deep. Zones 2-4 are entirely within the 
Nerweod Tuff. 
34. Beth the Arave and SI wells lie within the cone ef depression and the radius 
ef influence created by pumping PWWC #4. 
35. When #4 was first pump-tested, interference with the Arave well, expressed 
as a drop in the water level sufficient to. leave the pump in the Arave well witheut 
water, was quickly neted by the Araves, and the test was stepped. 
36. Later, after #4 was turned en again, the interference returned, first at the 
Arave well and later at the SI Well. 
37. PWWC put well #4 well into. eperatien, and the effect en the Arave well was 
again neticed within a shert time. The Arave well was unable to. preduce any 
water when #4 was pumped. Because ef this interference, PWWC cennected the 
Araves to. the PWWC culinary system in 2007. 
38. The SI well also. began to. struggle to. preduce water in September, 2007. 
Because the SI well ceuld net fill the cistern, the SI eperators, the Dehrers, were 
ferced to. use a hese to. cennect to. the Arave heme and fill the Inn cistern with 
PWWC water ebtained frem the Arave cennectien. 
39. Later, in 2007, the Inn was also. cennected to. the PWWC system because its 
well ceuld no. lenger meet its water needs. 
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40. The Araves, Southwick, and Sl originally were offered and accepted an 
arrangement with PWWC under which they would pay a flat rate of $20.00 per 
month for PWWC culinary water. Later, in 2012, PWWC unilaterally increased 
that amount to PWWC's standard tariff rates, which plaintiffs have paid each year 
since. 
41. The Araves have paid $7,003 to PWWC for water service. Southwick has 
paid $4,782. Venture has paid $19,839. 
42. PWWC #4 is turned on typically around July 1 of each year and is pumped 
through the remainder of the irrigation season, ending in late summer/early fall. 
43. Once hooked up to PWWC's water system, the Araves removed the pump 
from their well and have used the well as a monitoring well to document the 
impact of pumping #4 for several years. 
44. The use of the Arave well as a monitoring well has facilitated the parties' 
ability to gather data concerning the effect of PWWC #4. Had the Araves 
attempted to pump at the same time that PWWC #4 was pumped, the data would 
have been more difficult to interpret. 
45. The fact that the Arave Well has not been pumped has allowed good data 
collection to determine the impact of PWWC #4. 
46. The Arave Well is a very good surrogate for PWWC #4, meaning that it reacts 
. quickly and accurately to pumping in the #4. 
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47. Prior to the introduction of PWWC #4, neither the Araves (including 
Southwick) nor SI had any well or water availability or well pumping issues or 
problems in their current wells. The Arave and SI wells produced water 
year-round to satisfy the Arave, Southwick, and SI (Venture Dev.) water rights 
and uses. 
48. In March of 2017, Venture Development acquired 2 acre-feet of additional 
water by virtue of an approved Exchange with Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District. This additional water is approved for irrigation of .25 acres and 
year-round commercial purposes for the Inn. 
49. Prior to acquiring its additional 2 af under water right 35-13204 (E5647), SI 
used in a typical year more water than permitted by its original water right, and it 
used that water for irrigating its lawn and garden even though the water right is 
not authorized for irrigation uses. 
50. During the three years prior to trial, SI used approximately .33 af of its total 
.45 acre foot right (prior to the Exchange (E5647)) in the months before PWWC 
#4 was turned on. 
51. The prior SI operators, the Dohrers, kept a record of well use versus PWWC 
culinary water use. Patrick Dohrer explained how he alternated between using SI 
well water and PWWC culinary water after SI was connected to the PWWC 
culinary system by turning certain valves inside the Inn. 
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52. The Dohrer SI well versus PWWC water use record was not perfectly kept. It 
showed no SI well use during a time in approximately late August to early 
September 2014 when the SI well was actually being used. That well use during 
that period is depicted on plaintiffs' Exhibits 26 and 27. 
53. PWWC also kept a record of its #4 well use, but that record also was not 
entirely accurate. 
54. These errors in record keeping by the Dohrers and by PWWC were 
inadvertent. No bad faith or improper motive is found in connection with those 
errors.4 
55. Andrea Burk took over SI operations in 2014. She explained how she 
understood that valve system to work, but her understanding was incorrect. She 
did not understand how that valve system worked until it was shown to her during 
the trial. 
56. When PWWC #4 starts pumping the Arave well head begins to fall within 
hours. When the elevation of the Arave well head falls below the elevation of the 
SI well head, some water moves downward and away from the SI well 
unconsolidated aquifer toward the lower elevation of head now present in the 
4 For example, it is clear that the SI well was pumped during the late August to 
early September 2014 time frame because plaintiffs' expert, Paul Anderson, 
collected SI pumping head (i.e. water elevation) data during that period, which 
data is depicted on plaintiffs' Exhibits 26 and 27. There was no way to collect 
such data unless the SI well was being pumped. 
0399 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 130907544 
Page 14 
Norwood Tuff, essentially draining some of the water away from the 
unconsolidated aquifer and causing the head in the SI well to drop. 
57. As PWWC #4 continues to pump, it continues to draw down the level of the 
Arave well due to the deepening and widening cone of depression, created by 
pumping this deeper and higher volume well. The SI well clearly lies within this 
deep and wide cone of depression; hence, water moves from higher head in the 
SI well's aquifers to the lower head created by the #4 deepening cone in the 
Norwood Tuff. The result is that the SI well head drops, and the well struggles to 
produce even a minimal yield. 
58. In the winter-late spring of each year, the head in the Arave well is 
consistently higher in elevation (as shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 27) than the SI 
well. 
a. Water moves from high to low head, indicating that water monitored in 
the Norwood Tuff, at the Arave well, is moving upward toward the water 
monitored in the SI well, which is perforated in both the unconsolidated and 
Norwood Tuff aquifers. 
b. When this head relationship between the Arave and SI exists, there is 
no problem for the SI well to quickly fill and re-fill the Inn's cistern as 
demonstrated in Plaintiffs Exhibits 26 and 27. 
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c. It is when this Arave - 51 head level reverses-when the normally 
higher Arave head drops below the normally lower 51 head-that the 51 well is 
most noticeably affected. Its water level drops dramatically at that point. 
59. PWWC #4's interference with the 81 well is illustrated in plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. 
The graphs on that exhibit show that in December the 51 well recovers quickly, 
filling the cistern within fifteen minutes. During August, when PWWC #4 is 
pumping, the 81 well struggles for hours to fill the cistern. 
60. The Arave and 51 wells coexisted without interfering with each other. 
61. After PWWC #4 stops pumping, recovery time for the water levels in the 
Arave and 81 wells depends on the factors described above-how much #4 
pumps and how quickly the aquifer is recharged. 
62. The PWWC right is evidenced by an underlying Bureau of Reclamation water 
right, 35-7397, which has a 1930 priority. 
63. In 2006, PWWC obtained approval to move the point of diversion of its water 
right to a complex of five wells, including #4, subject to prior rights. 
64. The PWWC water delivered to plaintiffs after PWWC connected them to its 
system caused damage in the form of hard water deposits and build-up, requiring 
certain repairs and maintenance by each of the plaintiffs. 
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66. Araves incurred damages proximately caused by reason of PWWC's 
pumping of its well #4 in the form of (a) fees paid to PWWC for the water 
connection to PWWC's system necessitated by PWWC's interference with the 
Arave well, in the amount of $7,003; (b) the cost of a new pump and associated 
accessories estimated at $4,500. 
67. Southwick incurred damages proximately caused by reason of PWWC's 
pumping of its well #4 in the form of (a) fees paid to PWWC for the water 
connection to PWWC's system necessitated by PWWC's interference with the 
Arave well, in the amount of $4,782, (b) expenses incurred by reason of the hard 
water problems and related issues in the amount of $1 ,000, for total damages in 
the amount of $5,782.5 
68. Venture incurred damages proximately caused by reason of PWWC's 
pumping of its well #4 in the form of (a) fees paid to PWWC for the water 
connection to PWWC's system necessitated by PWWC's interference with the SI 
well, in the amount of $19,839; expenses incurred by reason of the hard water 
problems and related issues in the amount of $8,399, for total damages in the 
amount of $28,238. 
69. Patrick and Sherrie Dohrer operated SI from August 2005 to approximately 
August 2014, and during that time incurred certain costs and expenses caused 
S Southwick also lost several trees and a garden due to the inability to irrigate 
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by or related to interference with the 81 well. Those expenses total $10,538.83, 
and are identified in plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Dohrers assigned the claim for those 
expenses to Venture on May 31,2016. That figure is included in the foregoing 
Venture damages calculation. 
70. All of the parties' water uses are for beneficial purposes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
2. The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
§78A-5-1 02(1). 
3. Venue is proper pursuant to Utah Code §78B-3-301 inasmuch as the real 
property and water rights at issue in this matter are located in Weber County, 
Utah. 
A. Water Right Interference 
4. A determination of interference is a mixed question of fact and law. See 
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ~9, 144 P.3d 1147. The court "must first find 
facts regarding the claim of interference and then determine whether those facts 
are within the ambit of interference as applied to the water right at issue." Id. 
5. Water is public property, "subject to all existing rights to the use thereof." Utah 
Code §73-1-1(1). 
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7. The law of prior appropriation means that senior water rights have priority over 
junior rights. Prior appropriation applies always and everywhere to protect senior 
rights. U[S]enior water right holders are entitled to their full water right before 
junior water right holders are entitled to any water." Heal Utah v. Kane Cnty. etc., 
2016 UT App 153, ~6, 378 P.3d 1246). 
8. Water rights are real property. Utah Code §57-1-1(3)("Real property" or "real 
estate" means any right, title, estate, or interest in land ... and all water rights .. 
") ... 
9. No one may diminish, obstruct or interfere with the approved water rights of 
another. See North v. Marsh, 504 P.2d 1378, 1379 and n.2 (Utah 1973). 
10. Interference means to obstruct or hinder. See Black's Law Dictionary 831-32 
(8th ed. 2004). Specifically, in Utah water law, "obstructing or hindering the 
quantity or quality of an existing water right constitutes interference." Wayment, 
2006 UT 56,~ 13 (citations omitted). See also Bingham, 2010 UT 37, ~48. 
11. "Because underground waters cannot be observed nor measured with 
precision, but must be determined on the basis of geology, physics and 
hydrology, there are greater difficulties involved in their allocation and regulation 
than with respect to surface waters." Wayman v. Murray City, 458 P.2d 861, 863 
(Utah 1969). 
12. A water right consists of several constituent elements, which when taken 
together define a right to the use of water. Those elements include (i) quantity, 
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either or both in terms of volume (measured in acre-feet) and flow rate 
(measured in cubic feet per second), (ii) purpose of use, (iii) place of use, (iv) 
pOint of diversion, (v) time during which the water may be used, (vi) the source 
from which the water is diverted (either above or below ground), and (vii) priority 
date. See, e.g., Utah Code §73-3-17(1). 
13. A water right also includes an appropriator's right to continue use of the 
"existing and historical method of diverting the water." Wayment, 2006 UT 56, 
11'13. Here, plaintiffs' water rights are diverted solely by means of their wells. 
14. Protection of a senior right extends to the source. "No one can interfere with 
the source of supply of [a water right], regardless of how far it may be from the 
place of use, and whether it flows on the surface or underground, in such a 
manner as will diminish the quantity or injuriously affect the quality of the water of 
these established rights." Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 258 P.2d 
440,443 (Utah 1953).6 
15. The timing of water right use is protected. When implementing a change in 
the use of water, as PWWC did here when it moved water rights to its #4 well, it 
6 See also Justesen v. Olsen, 40 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1935)("From the beginning 
of our history, when a man went upon a stream of water, diverted it, and applied it 
to a beneficial use, his right to the use of that stream was recognized as being 
prior and superior to the rights of all subsequent appropriators to the extent of the 
reasonable necessities of the ... first appropriation. During the progress of our 
development, as new conditions presented themselves from time to time our 
courts have consistently enforced this right of priority and protected appropriators 
not only as against all subsequent claimants taking water from the body of the 
stream, but as against all persons interfering with its source."). 
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must ensure that senior rights are not harmed. "This requires that the vested 
rights of the lower users shall not be impaired by such changes either by 
reducing the flow of water ... or by changing the time of such flow to theU 
detriment [of senior rights]." East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 271 P.2d 449, 
453 (Utah 1954).7 
16. Plaintiffs' water rights are essential to their properties. The Araves and 
Southwick live there and, until being interfered with, depended on their water 
rights and the Arave well as the sole source of their culinary and secondary 
water. 
17. The SI well and water rights also add significant value to Venture's property. 
18. Without water, land loses tremendous, sometimes all, value. See, e.g., 
Sanpete America v. Willardsen, 2011 UT 48,1140,269 P.3d 118, and cases cited 
(discussing water's importance to land value). 
19. This action concerns groundwater and local well interference. The "rule of 
reasonableness" governs groundwater interference. Wayman, 458 P.2d at 866. 
20. Plaintiffs' and PWWC's respective water rights should be addressed under 
this "rule of reasonableness" to balance plaintiffs' senior water rights with 
PWWC's junior rights. 
7 See a/so Logan, Hyde Park, etc. v. Logan City, 269 P. 776, 778 (Utah 1928)(city 
"perpetually" enjOined from "operating its diverting works and power plant as to 
impound, obstruct, or impede in any manner the free and natural flow of the 
water of the river to which the [senior appropriators were] entitled ... ). 
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21. This requires analysis of the circumstances: the quantity of water available, 
the average annual recharge in the basin, the existing rights, and their priorities. 
Wayman, 458 P.2d at 865. 
22. All water users are required where necessary to "employ reasonable and 
efficient means in taking their own waters in relation to others to the end that 
wastage of water is avoided and that the greatest amount of available water is 
put to beneficial use." Wayman, 458 P.2d at 865. 
23. Wayman means essentially that, when rights clash, the court invokes reason 
so that, as far as possible, water is developed for beneficial use.s 
24. PWWC's #4 rights are junior in priority to plaintiffs' rights. 
25. Between appropriators, the one first in time is first in rights. Utah Code 
§73-3-1 (5)(a). 
26. Accordingly, "senior water right holders are entitled to their full water right 
before junior water right holders are entitled to any water." Heal Utah v. Kane 
Cnty. Water Ganserv. Dist., 2016 UT App 153, 'f6, 378 P.3d 1246 (citation 
omitted). 
27. No junior appropriator may interfere, directly or indirectly, with senior rights. 
Rasmussen v. Moroni Irr. Co., 189 P. 572, 577 (Utah 1920)("The first appropriator 
8 The "inquiry regarding interference focuses on actual interference in the quantity 
or quality of water to which the prior appropriator is entitled." Salt Lake City v. 
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 'f 28 n.10, 5 P.3d 1206, abrogated on 
other grounds by Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 
2009 UT 16, 'f'f 11-13, 203 P.3d 1015. 
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on the stream ... acquires a prior right to the use of all those waters, and no 
subsequent appropriator may interfere either directly or indirectly with the rights 
of the prior appropriator.").9 
28. Plaintiffs' means and method of diverting their water are reasonable. Their 
wells are the only possible method for diverting the water under their rights. 
Those wells functioned without problem until PWWC #4 was drilled. 
29. The PWWC change of its junior water rights to well #4, as all such changes 
are, was approved "subject to prior rights." Utah Code §73-3-17(6). 
30. The priority of the underlying right survives the change unless it interferes 
with other rights. Hague v. Nephi Irr. Co., 52 P. 765, 769 (Utah 1898)("When 
water has been lawfully appropriated the priority acquired is not lost by changing 
the use for which was first appropriated and applied, or the place at which it was 
first employed, provided that the alterations made are not injurious to the rights 
acquired by others prior to the change.") 
31. PWWC's pumping of its well #4 interferes with the Arave well, thus interfering 
with the senior Arave water rights. 
9 Moroni Irr. continues: "If .. . the appellant may cut off one of the sources of 
supply ... any other landowner and water user may cut off another source of 
supply, and so on until all the sources of supply which pass underneath the 
surface of the soil are cut off, and thus the lower and prior appropriator would be 
left without any, or at least only a meager, supply of water in the low-water 
season. This may not legally be done." 189 P. at 577. 
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32. PWWC's pumping of its well #4 interferes with the Arave well, thus interfering 
with the senior Southwick water rights. 
33. PWWC's pumping of its well #4 interferes with the SI well, thus interfering 
with the senior Venture water rights. 
34. PWWC's interference consists of dewatering the aquifers that are the source 
of supply for the Arave and 81 wells, thus obstructing and hindering the quantity 
of water available to the Arave and SI wells, first by depriving the Arave well of 
virtually all water, and by obstructing the SI well's ability to produce water. 
35. Because that change in PWWC's point of diversion interferes with the senior 
Arave, Southwick, and Venture Development rights, the original priority of the 
PWWC rights is lost. 
36. The PWWC #4, Arave and SI wells cannot co-exist under these 
circumstances. 
B.Negligence 
37. PWWC owes each plaintiff a duty of reasonable care to others foreseeably 
harmed by the method PWWC uses to obtain its water. See Bingham, 2010 UT 
37,1J65 (City owed "a duty of reasonable care to landowners who will foreseeably 
be harmed" by the method the city used to obtain its water."). 
38. PWWC breached that duty when it located, drilled, and used its #4 well in a 
manner that interferes with plaintiffs' wells. 
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39. Such interference was foreseeable given the close proximity to plaintiffs' 
wells, the much larger capacity of PWWC #4, and its depth and perforated zones 
in the aquifers used by the Arave and SI wells. 
40. The harm to plaintiffs' wells is proximately caused by PWWC's pumping of its 
well #4. 
41. Plaintiffs have been damaged by reason of PWWC's negligence as identified 
above. 
C. Plaintiffs' water use is not a defense to local well Interference. 
42. The fact that, historically, SI (or any other plaintiff) has or may have use,d 
more water than permitted by its water right is not a defense to local well 
interference. Neither is it a defense that SI used water for irrigation when it did 
not then have an irrigation right. 
43. The amount of water used under an approved water right, and the manner in 
which it is used, is a matter between the State (the Utah Division of Water Rights 
and the Utah State Engineer) and the water user. Utah Code §73-3-17(1)(b). The 
State Engineer has enforcement powers to remedy such matters. 
44. Even if SI used water only within its water right limit, and even if used only for 
indoor, domestic purposes for a single family, PWWC's pumping of its #4 well 
would still interfere with Venture's water right because it interferes with both the 
source, by dewatering the aquifer from which Venture's senior right is drawn, and 
the SI well, thus interfering with Venture's means and method of diversion. The 
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interference would be the same even if SI used less than its full water right 
because the interference affects the SI (and Arave) well's ability to produce water 
as needed on a year-round basis. 
45. Use of water pursuant to a water right is regulated by the Utah State 
Engineer, who has enforcement powers pursuant to Utah Code §73-2-25 if water 
is used without the right to do so, or beyond an eXisting right. 10 
46. Furthermore, if a senior water right user exceeds the limit of its right, thus 
taking more water from a source than is authorized, then a junior water right user 
on the same source (whether on the surface or underground) could have an 
interference claim because the excess water used by the senior user should be 
available to satisfy junior rights. PWWC brought no such claim. 
D. Remedies 
47. The PWWC #4, Arave, and SI wells cannot coexist under PWWC's current 
pumping routine. 
a. Pumping in #4 first depletes the water in the Arave well, causing its 
water level to drop below the SI water level, which reverses the pressure 
gradient, in turn causing the SI well level to drop. 
b. Accordingly, PWWC's pumping of #4 must either be stopped or 
curtailed sufficiently to permit the Arave and SI wells to function. 
JO u[T]he state engineer may commence an enforcement action ... if [he] finds 
that a person ... is diverting, impounding or using water in violation of an existing 
water right .... " Utah Code §73-2-25(2)(a). 
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c. Under Wayman's rule of reasonableness, the court must try to find a 
remedy that allows PWWC to use as much water as it can without interfering with 
the Arave and SI wells. 
d. PWWC owns other wells authorized for use under the same approval 
that permitted it to pump water from #4. 
e. PWWC is ordered to stop pumping #4 and use one or more of its other 
wells to satiSfy its irrigation demand. 
f. The court retains jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining 
whether it can be shown that PWWC #4 can be pumped at a lesser rate so as 
not to interfere with the Arave and SI wells, and specifically to prevent the Arave 
head from dropping below the SI head. If so, then PWWC #4 may continue to 
function under those circumstances. 
i. If PWWC #4 can be pumped at a level or rate that does not 
interfere with the Arave and SI wells, then PWWC shall install a flow meter 
pursuant to Utah Code §73-5-4. That meter shall be accessible by the 
state engineer pursuant to §73-5-4(2). PWWC shall further report its 
pumping data to the state engineer in a manner acceptable to the state 
engineer, and such pumping data shall be provided to plaintiffs on a 
weekly basis while #4 is pumped. 
ii. If PWWC #4 cannot be pumped at a level or rate that does not 
interfere with the Arave and SI wells, the court may order that PWWC 
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provide replacement water pursuant to Utah Code §73-3-23 at PWWC's 
sole expense. See Current Creek Irf. Co. v. Andrews, 344 P.2d 528, 531 
(Utah 1959)("[Junior appropriators] can appropriate water to a beneficial 
use from the underground basin if it is available but they must replace the 
flow of the wells and springs at the prior appropriator's place of diversion 
solely at their own cost."). 
iii. Should PWWC shift any of its well pumping to anyone or more 
of its other approved wells, those wells must be pump tested first to 
determine whether there is any impact to or interference with either the 
Arave or 81 wells. 
48. PWWC is ordered to pay damages as follows: Araves $11,503, Southwick 
$5,782, and Venture Development $28,238, plus post-judgment interest on each 
of these amounts at the statutory rate pursuant to Utah Code § 15-1-4. 
49. As the prevailing parties, plaintiffs are entitled to their costs pursuant to Rule 
54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in an amount to be set forth in a 
Verified Memorandum of Costs. 
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E. Judgment 
Pursuant to Rule 52(a)(1), a separate judgment consistent with this 
Memorandum Decision will be entered. Plaintiff will prepare the judgment and 
submit it to the court for signature. 
Dated this 4-day of November, 2017. 
~~1o---
~ie W. Jones ~ 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of November 2017, I sent a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing decision to counsel as follows: 
John H Mabey, Jr, David C Wright, Melinda L Hill 
Mabey Wright & James, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
175 South Main Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Edwin C Barnes, Emily E Lewis, Jonathan S Clyde 
Clyde Snow & Sessions 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2216 
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Counsel for Plaintiffs 
The Order of the Court is stated below: 
Dated: January 04, 2018 /s/ Ernie 
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STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SECOND DISTRlCT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
ROGER B. ARA VE and KIMBERLY L. 
ARA VE, JANET SOUTHWICK, Trustee, 
and VENTURE DEVELOPMENT GROUP, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




Case No. 130907544 
Judge Ernest W. Jones 
This action was tried to the bench August 18, 19, and 29, with closing arguments on 
September 25, 2017. Plaintiffs were represented by David C. Wright. Defendants were 
represented by Edwin C. Barnes and Emily E. Lewis. The palties also filed trial briefs. The 
court heard testimony from the witnesses, including expelt witnesses from both sides, and has 
reviewed the trial exhibits. The court also heard argument from counsel. After the close of the 
evidence, the court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
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which they did on September 21 , 2017. The COUlt entered its Memorandum Decision on 
November 14,2017, instructing plaintiffs to prepare a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 52(a) 
(1) to be entered under Rule 58A. 
Consistent with the COUlt's Memorandum Decision, the COUlt enters this Final Judgment 
as follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiffs, and each of them, and against Pineview 
West Water Company ("PWWC"), on plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief for common law 
interference with water rights. 
a. PWW C is ordered to stop pumping its Well #4 (State of Utah Well Identification 
No. 28707) and use one or more of its other wells to satisfy its irrigation demand. 
b. The COUlt retains jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining whether it 
can be shown that PWWC #4 can be pumped at a lesser rate so as not to interfere 
with plaintiffs' wells (State of Utah Well Identification Nos. 11238 (Arave Well) 
and 11242 (Venture Development Well), and specifically to prevent the Arave 
head from dropping below the SI head. If so, then PWWC #4 may continue to 
function under those circumstances. 
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i.If PWWC #4 can be pumped at a level or rate that does not interfere with 
plaintiffs' wells, then PWWC shall install a flow meter pursuant to Utah 
Code §73-5-4. That meter shall be accessible by the state engineer 
pursuant to §73-5-4(2). PWWC shall further report its pumping data to 
the state engineer in a manner acceptable to the state engineer, and such 




ii.If PWWC #4 cannot be pumped at a level or rate that does not interfere 
with plaintiffs' wells, the COUlt may order that PWWC provide 
replacement water pursuant to Utah Code §73-3-23 at PWWC's sole 
expense. 
iii. Should PWWC shift any of its well pumping to anyone or more of its 
other approved wells (including but not limited to Well Identification Nos. 
11248, 11249,427479), those wells must be pump tested first to determine 
whether there is any impact to or interference with either the Arave or 
Venture Development wells. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiffs, and each of them, and against PWWC, 
on plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief for negligence. 
3. Damages against PWWC are awarded on plaintiffs' First and Second Claims as follows: 
a. Roger and Kimberly Arave: $11,503, plus post-judgment interest at the statutory 
rate pursuant to Utah Code § 15-1-4. 
b. Janet Southwick, Trustee: $5,782, plus post-judgment interest at the statutory rate 
pursuant to Utah Code §15-1-4. 
c. Venture Development Group, LLC: $28,238, plus post-judgment interest at the 
statutory rate pursuant to Utah Code § 15-1-4. 
4. As prevailing parties, plaintiffs are entitled to their costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in an amount to be set fOlth in a Verified Memorandum of 
Costs. 
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5. The court's limited retention of jurisdiction in aid of this Judgment in ~l.b. does not 
affect its fmality. All of the claims and the patties ' respective rights have been 
determined. Accordingly, there is no just reason for delay of entry of this Final Judgment 
as to all of the claims and all of the parties. 
Approved as to Form: 
--------------------End of Judgment--------------------
Comt's e-signature at top of first page 
Edwin C. Barnes (e-signature wi permission) 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Emily E. Lewis 
Counsel for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on December 19, 2017, the foregoing Final Judgment was served via E-
Filing system to the following: 
Edwin C. Barnes - ecb@clydesnow.com 
Emily E. Lewis - eel@clydesnow.com 
Clyde Snow & Sessions 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
January 04, 2018 05:08 PM 




John H. Mabey, J1'. - 4625 
David C. Wright - 5566 
MABEY WRIGHT & JAMES, PLLC 
175 South Main, # 1330 





Counsel for Plaintiffs 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
ROGER B. ARA VE and KIMBERL Y L. 
ARA VE, JANET SOUTHWICK, Trustee, 
and VENTURE DEVELOPMENT GROUP, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PINEVIEW WEST WATER COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT 
Case No. 130907544 
Judge Ernest W. Jones 
This action was tried to the bench August 18, 19, and 29, with closing arguments on 
September 25, 2017. Plaintiffs were represented by David C. Wright. Defendants were 
represented by Edwin C. Barnes and Emily E. Lewis. The patiies also filed trial briefs. The 
comi heard testimony from the witnesses, including expeli witnesses from both sides, and has 
reviewed the trial exhibits. The court also heard argument from counsel. After the close of the 
evidence, the court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
0445 
January 10, 2018 08:38 AM 1 of 2 
which they did on September 21, 2017. The cOUli entered its Memorandum Decision on 
November 14, 2017, instructing plaintiffs to prepare a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 52(a) 
(1) to be entered under Rule 58A. 
Consistent with the couti's Memorandum Decision, the court amends paragraph 4 of its 
Final Judgment as follows: 
As prevailing parties, plaintiffs are awarded costs in the amount of $2,059.96 pursuant to 
Rule 54( d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Approved as to Form: 
--------------------End of Judgment--------------------
Court's e-signature at top of first page 
Edwin C. Barnes (e-signature wi permission) 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Emily E. Lewis 
Counsel for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on January 8,2017, the foregoing Amended Final Judgment was served via 
E-Filing system to the following: 
Edwin C. Barnes - ecb@c1ydesnow.com 
Emily E. Lewis - eel@clydesnow.com 
Clyde Snow & Sessions 
201 South Main Street, 13tll Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
January 10, 2018 08:38 AM 
David C. Wright 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Area 35 Water Rights Policies 
• Services Agencies 
AREA 35 - WEBER AND OGDEN RIVERS 
Updated: April 3, 2018 
Recent changes and additions in red text 
MANAGEMENT 
The 1937 Weber River Decree and the 1948 Ogden River Decree adjudicated the area's surface 
water rights prior to those dates. No adjudications have been ordered to update these decrees or 
include ground-water rights. There are two state-administered distribution systems in this area: the 
Weber River Distribution System and the Ogden River Distribution System. Parts of the area are 
also subject to the conditions of two groundwater management plans: the Groundwater 
Management Plan for the Weber Delta Sub-Area, and the State Engineer's Interim Policy for 
Snyderville and the Park City Basin . Click here to see statistics for this area. 
SOURCES 
Surface Water - Surface waters are considered to be fully appropriated. Diligence Claims may be 
filed on water uses not in the decrees and which were established prior to 1903 for surface water 
and 1935 for underground water. New diversions and consumptive uses in these sources must be 
accomplished by change applications filed on owned or acquired rights. Non-consumptive use 
applications, such as hydroelectric power generation, will be considered on their individual merits. 
Fixed period or transient projects in canyon or foothill areas must be handled by temporary change 
applications. Per the State Engineer's Public Meeting Response Letter dated October 26, 2004, 
new water diversions, based on exchange applications, will be permitted for those projects where 
there is water available in the proposed source that can be diverted without impairing the rights of 
others or where water can be released from upstream storage to directly compensate intervening 
rights that might be impaired. 
Per the State Engineer's Public Meeting Response Letter dated October 28, 2011: 
• Exchange applications will continue to be considered on their own merit. New water diversions, 
based on exchange applications, will be permitted for projects where there is water available in the 
proposed source that can be diverted without impairing the existing rights on the source, and 
where water can be released under the exchange to replace water for downstream rights. 
• New water diversions, based on exchange applications, that might impact tributary streams that 
are fully diverted under existing water rights may need a study provided by the applicant. This 
study will need to demonstrate that the groundwater being developed does not contribute to the 
flow of a surface source that does not receive a full year supply, which cannot be compensated 
directly by releases from upstream storage. The need for a study will be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 
Ground Water - There is a limited ground-water resource available. No new appropriations are 
approved above the mouths of the canyons. Development of new or different consumptive use 
projects in these areas must be accomplished by change applications on owned or acquired rights. 
New appropriations below the canyons are reviewed on an individual basis. Individual domestic 
filings for 1.0 acre-foot per year are generally approved where a public water supply is not 
accessible . Larger projects are generally held pending development of approved rights and data 
from water users. Changes from surface to underground sources, and vice versa , are also 
considered on their individual merits, with emphasis on their potential to interfere with existing 
rights and to ensure that there is no enlargement of the underlying rights. Applicants are placed on 
notice that development should be pursued as soon as possible. Extension of time requests will be 
critically reviewed beyond the initial five year period . Per the State Engineer's Public Meeting 
Response Letter dated October 26, 2004, the aquifer test requirement on new wells in the Kamas 
East Subdivision has been removed . 
Approvals based on irrigation company stock or leases generally contain conditions requiring 
maintenance of shares or contracts for the underlying changed rights and/or installation of 
measuring devices. In some instances, further limitations are imposed as follows: 
• Snyderville/Park City Sub-basin : Only change or exchange applications based on rights already 
approved within this boundaries of this sub-basin are approved. See the management plan 
referenced above for more details. 
• Samak Area: Changes on shares of stock in Beaver and Shingle Creek Irrigation Company are 
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Policy area in green, 
click on the map for more detail 
DESCRIPTION 
This area includes the main stem of the 
Ogden River and its tributaries (North, 
Middle, and South Forks) in Weber 
County and the main stem of the Weber 
River and its tributaries (Beaver Creek, 
East Canyon Creek, Chalk Creek, Heiners 
Creek, Lost Creek, and Cottonwood 
Creek) in Weber, Morgan, and western 
Summit Counties. 
Click for Interactive Map I 
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shares, installation of measuring devices, and the restriction of irrigation at the new diversion to the 
same period in which water is available in the original canal system. 
• Garff Ranch/Kamas Area : The State Engineer's policy for this area was changed on Apri l 3, 
2018. Exchanges based on contracts with Weber Basin Water Conservancy District are limited to 
1.0 acre-feet at a time . Whereas the prior policy restricted certa in lots to indoor domestic use only, 
the new policy has no restrictions on nature of use. See the following: 
• State Engineer's Policy Letter 
• Public Meeting Notice and Materials 
• Presentation Slides from Public Meeting 
• West Hoytsville Area: The West Hoytsville groundwater system is characterized by fractured 
volcanic rock. Fracture density appears to decrease with depth. Wells typically have low yields and 
can interfere with each other if the same fracture system is intercepted. Residents in the area are 
currently exploring alternatives to organize a community water system. The Summit County 
economic development director has requested he be contacted regarding the filing of additional 
exchange applications in the area. His email addressis dsargent@co.summit.ut.us 
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PLANS 
• Effective October 31, 1995, the East Shore Area is is subject to the conditions of the 
Groundwater Management Plan for the Weber Delta Sub-Area. Monitoring of groundwater levels 
indicated general declines over the entire sub-area. Lands previously devoted to irrigated 
agriculture are being converted to commercial and residential uses. This plan can , hopefully, 
provide a framework for the orderly and efficient development of ground-water supplies while 
minimizing such attendant problems as well interference, contamination, and over-utilization. 
Contamination concerns near Hill Air Force Base are also addressed. 
• Effective February 9, 1999, the Snyderville and Park City Basin is subject to the conditions of 
the State Engineer's Interim Policy. The management plan was developed in response to rapid 
population growth in the area to maintain the viability and sustainability of the resource. Primary 
water uses have rapidly transformed from mining and agriculture to residential, commercial, and 
industrial needs. 




Applications are advertised in the Ogden Standard-Examiner, the Morgan County News, the 
Summit County Bee, or the Park City Record. Filings that may involve the diversion of water in 
Utah for use in Wyoming (export) would be subject to the special criteria the statutes require for 
such projects. The general irrigation diversion duty for this area, which the State Engineer uses for 
evaluation purposes, is 4.0 acre-feet per acre per year (af/ac) in valley regions of western Weber 
County and 3.0 aflac in the canyons and upper valleys. The consumptive use requirements are 
determined from the publication Consumptive Use of Irrigated Crops in Utah, Research Report 
145, Utah State University, 1994, unless the applicant submits other data for consideration . This 
area is administered by the Weber River Regional Office in Salt Lake City. 
Other requirements 
The Water Right applicant is strongly cautioned that other permits may be required before any 
physical development of a project can begin and it is the responsibility of the applicant to determine 
the applicability of and acquisition of such permits. In order to avoid delays and ensure that Water 
Right approvals conform to applicable local ordinances, applicants should contact local 
governmental entities in advance to determine what ordinances are in place that affect the 
proposed project and to make sure that Water Right filings conform to those ordinances. The 
approval of a Water Right application does not imply any approval of a project by any other 
governmental entity. Approval of the project proposed in the Water Right application should be 
obtained from local governmental entities as necessary to implement a project. 
REFERENCES 
Techn ical Publication No. 2, The Ogden Valley Artesian Reservoir, Weber County, Utah; Utah 
State Engineer; 1945. 
Technical Publication No. 27, Water Resources of the Heber-Kamas-Park City Area, North-Central 
Utah; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1970. 
Technical Publication No. 35, Ground-water Conditions in the East Shore Area, Box Elder, Davis, 
and Weber Counties, Utah, 1960-69; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1972. 
httos:llwww. watenights. utah.gov/wrinfo/policy Iwrareas/area3 5.asp 
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Technical Publication No. 76, Reconnaissance of the Quality of Surface Water in the Weber River 
Basin, Utah; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1983. 
Technical Publication No. 77, Ground-water Reconnaissance of the Central Weber River Area, 
Morgan and Summit Counties, Utah; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1984. 
Technical Publication No. 85, Water Resources of the Park City Area, Utah, with Emphasis on 
Ground Water; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1986. 
Technical Publication No. 90, Seepage Studies of the Weber River and the Davis-Weber and 
Ogden Valley Canals, Davis and Weber Counties, Utah, 1985; Utah Department of Natural 
Resources; 1987. 
Technical Publication No. 93, Ground-Water Resources of the East Shore Area of the Great Salt 
Lake, Utah, and Simulated Effects of Ground-Water Withdrawals; Utah Department of Natural 
Resources; 1990. 
Technical Publication No. 99, Hydrology of Ogden Valley and the Surrounding Area, Eastern 
Weber County, Utah, and Computer Simulation of the Valley-Fill Aquifer System; Utah Department 
of Natural Resources; 1990. 
Technical Publication No. 115, Hydrology and snowmelt simUlation of Snyderville Basin, Park City, 
and adjacent areas, Summit County, Utah; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1998. 
Basic Data Report No. 1, Records and Water-Level Measurements of Selected Wells and 
Chemical Analyses of Ground Water, East Shores Areas, Weber and Box Elder Counties, Utah; 
Utah State Engineer; 1961. 
Basic Data Report No. 45, Selected Hydrologic Data from Wells in the East Shore Area of the 
Great Salt Lake, Utah, 1985; Utah Department of Natural Resources; 1986. 
Information Bulletin No. 9, Projected 1975 Municipal Water Use Requirements, Weber County, 
Utah; Utah State Engineer; 1962. 
Water Resource Bulletin No. 29, The Geology of the Kamas-Coalville Region, Summit County, 
Utah, and its Relation to Ground-Water Conditions; Utah Geological Survey; 2002. Note: Very 
large download! 
UGS Special Study, Hydrogeology of Morgan Valley, Morgan County, Utah; Utah Geological 
Survey; 2011 . 
MODELING 
Regional Ground-Water Flow, Carbonate-Rock Province, Nevada, Utah, and Adjacent States; 
USGS Open-File Reports 93-170 and 93-420; 1993. 
Morgan Valley Ground-water Flow Model; 1984. 
Ogden Valley Ground-water Flow Model; 1991 . 
Weber Delta Ground-water Flow Model, 1990. 
PREVIOUS PAGE UPDATES 
December 24, 2002, June 14, 2004, September 24, 2004, October 26, 2004, April 10, 2011 , 
October 28, 2011 
Utah Division of Water Rights I 1594 West North Temple Suite 220, P.O. Box 146300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6300 I 801-538-7240 
Utah.gov I Natural Resources I Contact I Tenns of Use I Privacy Policy I Accessibility Policy I Translate Utah.goY 
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ADDENDUM 5 
Utah Code Ann . .§ 73-3-17 
Statutes current through the 2018 Second Special Session 
Utah Code Annotated> Title 73 Water and Irrigation (Chs. 1 - 30) > Chapter 3 Appropriation (§§ 73-3-1-
73-3-31) 
73-3-17. Certificate of appropriation - Evidence. 
(l)Upon the satisfaction ofthe state engineer that an appropriation, a permanent change of point of diversion, place or 
purpose of use, or a fixed time change authorized by Section 73-3-30 has been perfected in accordance with the 
application, and that the water appropriated or affected by the change has been put to a beneficial use, as required by 
Section 73-3-16 or 73-3-30, the state engineer shall issue a certificate, in duplicate, setting forth: 
(a)the name and post-office address ofthe person by whom the water is used; 
(b)the quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow in second-feet appropriated; 
(c)the purpose for which the water is used; 
(d)the time during which the water is to be used each year; 
(e )the name of the stream or water source: 
(i)from which the water is diverted; or 
(ii)within which an instream flow is maintained; 
(f)the date ofthe appropriation or change; and 
(g)other information that defines the extent and conditions of actual application of the water to a beneficial use. 
(2)A certificate issued on an application for one ofthe following types ofprojects need show no more than the facts shown 
in the proof submitted under Section 73-3-16: 
(a)a project constructed according to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources - Division of Water 
Resources; 
(b)a federal project constructed by the United States Bureau ofReciamation, referred to in Section 73-3-16; and 
(c)a surface water storage facility in excess of 1,000 acre-feet constructed by a public water supplier. 
(3)A certificate under this section does not extend the rights described in the application. 
(4)Failure to file proof of appropriation or proof of change of the water on or before the date set therefor causes the 
application to lapse. 
(S)One copy of a certificate issued under this section shall be filed in the office of the state engineer and the other shall be 
delivered to the appropriator or to the person making the change who may record the certificate in the office of the county 
recorder of the county in which the water is diverted from the natural stream or source. 
(6)The celtificate issued under this section is prima facie evidence of the owner's right to use the water in the quantity, for 
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